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Why does the Torah (תורה) interrupt the laws of judges with the mitzvah (מצוה) to help even your enemy's overloaded donkey? The shiur develops the principle that even when Torah obligates you to hate someone for their wicked deeds, you must still help them—because you hate the wickedness, not the person. This Torah structure teaches judges (and all of us) never to disqualify a wicked person's testimony or character wholesale.
Rabbi Zweig opens with the Torah (תורה)'s laws in Parshas Mishpatim governing how judges must conduct themselves in court. The Torah forbids judges from showing favoritism to a poor litigant—even when the judge might rationalize that ruling in the poor man's favor would save him from the indignity of begging. The Rambam (רמב"ם) explains that the prohibition "lo sehedah" (do not honor him) means the judge may not grant the poor man undeserved dignity by awarding him a case he should lose. The Torah then presents laws requiring majority votes for conviction, followed by a seemingly unrelated cluster of mitzvos: returning lost objects and helping unload an overburdened animal. Immediately after, the Torah returns to the laws of judges, commanding that a wicked person ("evyon") must not have the law tilted against him in court. This structure poses a fundamental question: why does the Torah interrupt the laws of judges with mitzvos that apply to everyone, then return to judicial law? Rabbi Zweig proposes that this structural "digression" teaches a profound principle about how we relate to wicked people. The key lies in the mitzvah (מצוה) sandwiched in the middle: if you see the donkey of "your enemy" overburdened, you are obligated to help unload it or load it. The Gemara (גמרא) defines "your enemy" as someone you personally witnessed committing a serious sin—someone the Torah obligates you to hate. Yet the Torah commands you to help him with his donkey. This juxtaposition reveals that even when the Torah requires you to hate a person for their wickedness, you remain fully obligated to assist them in every way. You hate the evil deed, not the human being.
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Mishpatim (Shemos 23)
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