משפטים
Dedicate a Shiur in Parshas Mishpatim
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125 shiurim for Parshas Mishpatim
What makes mishpatim fundamentally different from other mitzvos? The shiur develops a yesod that mishpatim recognize pre-existing rights while other mitzvos create obligations. When someone steals, they violate both God's law and the victim's inherent right to property, explaining why probability works differently in interpersonal versus ritual law.
Why does the Torah introduce mishpatim with the metaphor of setting a prepared table? The shiur argues that rational mitzvos should be performed with understanding and natural desire, not mere obedience. This explains why we don't make blessings on charity and why technical observance without heartfelt compliance led to Jerusalem's destruction.
How can Judaism permit slavery at all? The shiur reveals that Jewish slavery functions as therapy for those who've lost self-respect through irresponsible choices like theft. A ganav who steals secretly has already degraded himself to slave-like status, and the six-year servitude aims to restore his human dignity through careful treatment.
Why does the Torah present contradictory formulations about murder laws across different parshios? The shiur identifies two distinct theories operating simultaneously: justice-based punishment (Mishpatim) and the concept that Jews embody God, making strikes against them strikes against the Divine (Emor). This framework explains varying punishments for gentiles versus Jews and illuminates debates about abortion and euthanasia.
Why does unintentional murder trigger such unusual laws - no formal trial, cities of refuge, and freedom only when the Kohen Gadol dies? Murder uniquely threatens belief in Divine Providence by suggesting humans control others' destinies. The entire system demonstrates that God, not man, controls life and death, with the cities serving as rehabilitation centers where murderers learn complete dependence on Divine will.
Why does striking a parent carry the death penalty while striking others requires only compensation? The Torah establishes that receiving a favor creates moral obligation - when someone benefits us, we become obligated to reciprocate. This principle explains both kibud av v'em and our obligation to serve God, who gave us existence itself.
Why does the Torah use 'eye for an eye' language when the Talmud requires monetary compensation? The shiur argues that criminal punishment terminology preserves the moral gravity of personal injury, which cannot be truly compensated like property damage. This prevents the dangerous illusion that money fully restores harm and maintains deterrence against reducing human life to mere economics.
How can Torah claim divine originality when Hammurabi's Code (1800 BCE) contains similar laws like eye-for-eye and goring ox legislation? The shiur develops the yesod that God used Torah as creation's blueprint, so ancient peoples weren't creating precedents Torah copied but rather sensing universal truths embedded in reality's fabric. This explains both Maimonides' approach to sacrifices and how Avrohom kept all 613 mitzvos before Sinai.
Why does the Torah impose capital punishment on the owner of a habitually dangerous ox that kills? Animals are extensions of their owners' identities rather than independent entities, making the owner spiritually responsible for the animal's actions. This principle explains numerous halachos distinguishing animal damage from other forms of property damage.
Why does magefah strike the righteous along with the wicked, while divine punishment targets specific sinners? The shiur develops a yesod distinguishing between targeted divine anger (af) and blind divine fury (cheimah) that seeks any outlet. Magefah occurs when God's essence is personally attacked through idolatry or public humiliation, triggering indiscriminate destruction that can mercifully be redirected toward inanimate objects.
Why does Parshas Mishpatim specify exact damage payments when Beis Din has broad powers to create its own penalties? The shiur develops that precise divine justice creates unity rather than division. When punishments are calibrated by divine wisdom rather than human judgment, both parties feel the exchange is perfectly measured, maintaining the national unity that depends on each person subordinating their will to Hashem's will.
When the Torah says 'if the sun has risen' regarding killing a thief, does the figurative meaning (clear intentions) replace the literal (daytime) or complement it? The machlokes between Rambam and Ra'avad establishes whether deeper Torah interpretations work independently of pshat or must always ground themselves in literal meaning.
What does "na'aseh v'nishma" really mean, and why is it superior to simple obedience? The Baal HaTurim's insight reveals that v'nishma is passive voice—"it will be understood"—meaning the mitzvos themselves generate understanding and fulfillment when performed. This madreiga was lost at Sinai with "kafah aleihem har k'gigis" but restored at Purim, where Klal Yisrael reaffirmed that mitzvos are our essence, not mere obligations.
Does raising your hand to threaten someone violate the Torah's prohibition against hitting, or is it merely wicked behavior? The shiur analyzes Targum Yonasan ben Uziel's interpretation that the fortieth lash is an assault gesture (kamatzef), not actual contact. This suggests assault may carry the same halachic status as battery, with major implications for teshuvah and chinuch.
Why does the Torah credit Bezalel by name for building the Aron when God gave him all his miraculous abilities? The shiur develops the principle that only effort—not God-given talent—defines a person's worth. The Nesiim's punishment for delaying their gifts teaches that true leadership means modeling work ethic, not just delivering results.
Why does Rashi emphasize that Mishpatim's social justice laws were given at Sinai, just like the Ten Commandments? The shiur develops a yesod that Sinai was a marriage between God and Israel, and these laws define the character traits God seeks in a spouse—not just behavior codes but the refined middos of someone who genuinely does not want to harm or steal. This becomes a source for the Rambam's principle distinguishing ritual and interpersonal mitzvos.
Why does the Torah use "asher tosim lifneihem" — "place before them" — instead of commanding the mishpatim? Rashi explains that interpersonal laws must be presented like a set table (shulchan aruch), made appetizing and enticing, because people assume they're experts in social relationships and won't listen to rules they don't buy into. The shiur explores why mishpatim require unique pedagogy and why the ganav is sold as an eved — he already exhibits eved-like traits of avoiding responsibility.
Why does the covenant at Sinai focus on Mishpatim—laws that the Ramban says apply to all mankind? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: at Har Sinai, God established a relationship not only with the Jewish people but with all humanity through the Noahide laws. The Jewish people, through Sefer HaBris, accepted stewardship to ensure the entire world maintains these universal laws and has the resources to survive and fulfill them.
What is the 'Sefer HaBris' that was read at Sinai - just the recent mitzvos or the entire Torah narrative from creation? The shiur develops the idea that Matan Torah was essentially a marriage ceremony, making the Sefer HaBris the 'book of vision' that established shared purpose between God and the Jewish people. This teaches that successful marriages require common goals and life vision, not just compatibility.
Why does the Torah add that the widow won't receive her kesuvah and the orphans won't inherit when their husband/father is killed for oppressing widows and orphans? The shiur develops the idea that a person who oppresses the vulnerable lacks sensitivity precisely because his own family never showed him how deeply they depend on him. Therefore, the family shares responsibility and loses their normal inheritance rights.
Why does the Torah use "begapo" (his wing) to describe an unmarried person in the laws of Hebrew servants? The shiur explains that the term reflects a fundamental principle: marriage is not merely an acquisition or partnership but a merger of two bodies into one entity. When husband and wife share one garment at the chuppah, it symbolizes that their bodies have become unified.
Why should a beis din pursue compromise even when the dayan already knows who is legally correct? The shiur distinguishes between din Torah, which adjudicates monetary obligations, and pshara, which addresses the underlying relationship between parties. Preserving shalom between people is a higher responsibility than vindicating rights—even a "winning" verdict can destroy a friendship that years of peaceful coexistence built.
Why does the Torah threaten that if you oppress a widow or orphan, God will kill you and leave your body unfound—punishing your own wife and children? Rashi reveals the Torah is addressing someone who failed to understand what a father means to a child or a husband to a wife—because his own family never made him feel it. God's fury is personal because He is a partner in every family unit.
Why does Parshas Mishpatim require teaching the reasons (ta'amei hamitzvos) when the rest of Torah requires only knowing the laws? The shiur develops that Mishpatim represent obligations we owe to ourselves, not just to Hashem—they must become internalized through understanding. This explains why going to secular courts is forbidden even when their laws match ours: only Torah courts can convey the ta'amim that transform law into self-obligation.
Why do the women at Kriyat Yam Suf sing, dance, and play instruments while the men only sing? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: men must transform themselves from zachar (masculine) to nekeva (feminine) to serve Hashem—surrendering rights, control, and entitlement to build a relationship based on pure trust and bittul. This transformation is the entire purpose of Yetzias Mitzrayim and the foundation of Kabbalat HaTorah.
Why does the Torah punish the families of those who oppress orphans and widows? The person lacks sensitivity because his own family never expressed appreciation for him, leaving him unable to understand others' emotional vulnerability. When wives and children fail to make fathers feel valued, it creates insensitivity that harms society's most vulnerable.
Why does Shemos 22:21–23 punish the abuser's wife and children when he mistreats orphans and widows? The shiur develops a striking yesod: a person cannot be sensitive to others' vulnerability unless his own family teaches him emotional awareness. Wives must tell husbands how much they mean to them, and children must express love to parents—otherwise the family itself is culpable for the father's insensitivity.
Why does the Torah command candle-lighting only on Shabbos if shalom bayis applies all week? The shiur develops the concept that shalom bayis means not merely avoiding conflict but actively developing and elevating one another. Torah law is presented as a "set table" (Shulchan Aruch) — creating appetite and buy-in, not mere behavioral regulation — so that we grow from mitzvos and from each other.
Why does the Torah split Matan Torah across Parshas Yisro and Mishpatim, seemingly repeating events out of order? The shiur demonstrates that Yisro establishes klal Yisrael as a unified entity ("yachdav"), while Mishpatim takes that unity further to "kol echad"—one collective voice. This progression from communal bond to merged identity explains the structure: first we connect to each other, then we connect to Hashem.
Why does Rashi insist Moshe must teach the reasons for the mishpatim, not just the laws themselves? The shiur develops a yesod from the phrase "shulchan aruch"—a set table—that mitzvos must be experienced with appetite and anticipation, not mere compliance. Halacha is a menu designed to inspire desire, not an army manual of behavior.
Is raising your hand against someone (assault) merely a "shem rasha" or is it a Torah prohibition that carries malkus? The shiur analyzes whether the lav applies only when you actually hit (battery) or whether threatening counts as the beginning of the prohibited act. Targum Yonasan ben Uziel's reading of "arba'im yakenu"—that the fortieth malkah is lifting the hand without striking—suggests that the gesture itself constitutes a hakah and triggers the lav.
Why does Rashi say going to secular court—even when the law is identical—is a desecration of God's name? The shiur develops the yesod that all interpersonal laws are not merely social contracts but divine mandates. How we treat each other is not only bein adam l'chaveiro but bein adam l'Makom, making monetary disputes and daily interactions part of our religious experience, not just synagogue ritual.
What is the fundamental difference between shevuah and eidus in shomrim cases? Rashi's approach, challenged by Ramban, distinguishes between establishing the trustworthiness of a person (shevuah) and establishing objective facts (eidus). The shiur shows that by shomer chinam, where liability depends only on wrongdoing, shevuah suffices; by shomer sachar, where the specific cause of loss matters, eidim are required to establish facts.
Why does the Torah forbid charging interest even when the borrower willingly agrees? The pasuk's unusual sequence—forbidding pressing for payment before mentioning interest—reveals that interest itself is a form of pressure. Every day the debt grows creates unbearable stress on the borrower, making him owe more than he received and constantly reminding him of mounting obligations.
Does mefateh require genuine consent, or only a non-coerced act? Rashi holds that mefateh means she truly agreed—mind control or manipulation counts as ones. The Ramban (aligned with the Rambam) holds that as long as the act itself wasn't forced, it's mefateh, even if her agreement was manipulated. The shiur explores this through the lens of hishtadlus and real-world cases like cult manipulation.
When the Torah commands helping someone whose donkey is collapsing, Targum Onkelos says you must "abandon the hate in your heart"—but how can you abandon hatred toward someone you're obligated to hate for his sins? The shiur contrasts Rashi's approach (hate the sin but not the person, so genuine help is possible) with Targum's (you hate the person but must temporarily let go to help him properly).
Why does the Torah sell a thief as an eved ivri rather than have him pay off his debt gradually like other debtors? The shiur argues that Parashas Mishpatim addresses not victim compensation but the thief's character flaw—his refusal to take responsibility, the defining trait of an eved. By requiring immediate full payment and forcing him to work it off, the Torah teaches him accountability and the satisfaction of meeting obligations.
Why does the Torah write "if you lend money" (im kesef talveh) when lending is obligatory? The unusual formulation teaches that the obligation isn't merely to lend—it's to develop genuine care and concern for the borrower. The shiur explores how interpersonal mitzvos must be performed with emotional connection, not just technical compliance, and why brachos are never made on such mitzvos.
Why does the Torah begin Mishpatim with the laws of eved ivri before establishing that a thief must make restitution? The parasha addresses not compensation but rehabilitation: the ganav exhibits eved-like behavior—avoiding responsibility. Selling him as an eved forces immediate responsibility, teaching him accountability through the experience of paying off his debt upfront rather than over time.
Why does the Torah emphasize that Adam may eat vegetables and fruits "that have seeds" when all produce has seeds? The shiur develops a yesod that seeds represent our obligation to replace what we consume. Brachos serve not only to request permission but to ask Hashem to replenish the world's resources—a perspective that transforms every meal into an act of responsibility for others.
Why does "begapo" (unmarried) literally mean "in the corner of his clothing"? Rashi explains that an unmarried person's garment ends at his own body, but when husband and wife become one physical entity, the edge of his clothing reaches her body—they share one garment. This reading reveals the basis for the Gemara's definition of chuppah as "spreading his tallis over her."
Why does Parshas Mishpatim begin with the obscure law of the Jewish servant instead of the more fundamental laws of theft? The shiur reveals that the eved ivri possesses a "slave mentality" rooted in Adam's refusal to take responsibility—"the woman gave it to me." The six-year servitude is designed to cure this pathology by forcing the thief to take full financial responsibility for both his debt and his family, teaching him the dignity of self-support.
Why does the Torah command lending money using the conditional word "im" (if) when lending is actually obligatory? The shiur reveals that "im" teaches the proper manner: you must lend money as if you want to, making the recipient feel cared for rather than burdened. This insight unlocks the difference between the two accounts of Matan Torah—Yisro establishes our servitude to Hashem, while Mishpatim creates a bris that grants us rights and demands sensitivity in all interpersonal mitzvos.
How can the word "azov" mean both "abandon" and "help" when these are opposite concepts? The Torah's command of "azov taazov imo" reveals that true help means empowering someone to stand independently. Real assistance requires the ability to let go—otherwise you cripple rather than enable.
Why does the Torah threaten that oppressors of widows and orphans will have wives who become "widows" unable to prove their husbands' deaths and children who become "orphans" unable to inherit? The curse fits the crime: oppressing the vulnerable doesn't just exploit weakness—it forces them to relive their loss. The measure-for-measure punishment creates perpetual, unresolvable pain that mirrors the psychological torment inflicted on those who are constantly reminded of their vulnerability.
Why does the Torah punish the perpetrator's wife and children when a man oppresses widows and orphans? The shiur develops a profound yesod: oppressing a widow reawakens her trauma of loss, effectively "killing" her husband again in her experience. The perpetrator's family shares culpability because they failed to teach him the value of being a spouse and parent through proper respect and relationship.
Why does Rashi say "ma'eilu miSinai af eilu miSinai" — that mishpatim are from Sinai just like chukim? The shiur argues that without Torah, we'd have no real understanding of interpersonal relationships. Secular law sees compensation as adequate; Torah law reveals that monetary payment for bodily harm (ayin tachas ayin) can never truly restore what was taken, demanding humility, apology, and permanent recognition of the wrong done.
Why does Parshas Mishpatim begin with the laws of Eved Ivri, seemingly distant and impractical? The shiur explains that Mishpatim represents a second level of Kabbalas HaTorah—not just submission to Hashem's will, but understanding Torah's personal benefit (na'aseh v'nishma). Eved Ivri teaches ultimate responsibility: a thief who avoided accountability must now pay his full debt upfront and support dependents beyond normal obligation, training him to own his choices.
Why does the Torah interrupt the laws of judges with the mitzvah to help even your enemy's overloaded donkey? The shiur develops the principle that even when Torah obligates you to hate someone for their wicked deeds, you must still help them—because you hate the wickedness, not the person. This Torah structure teaches judges (and all of us) never to disqualify a wicked person's testimony or character wholesale.
Why does the Torah interrupt its laws of judges with commandments about returning a lost animal and helping an enemy's overburdened donkey? The shiur shows that these mitzvos teach a fundamental principle: we are commanded to hate a person's wickedness, not the person himself. This insight explains both Moshe's judicial system and how to maintain relationships even with those whose actions we despise.
Why do the laws of Hebrew servants open Parshas Mishpatim's social justice section? The Torah targets theft specifically because thieves avoid responsibility by acting secretly, revealing a slave mentality. The six-year servitude teaches responsibility through immediate, complete restitution rather than mere punishment.
Why does the Torah begin the Mishpatim—civil law—with the obscure case of eved ivri (Hebrew servant)? The shiur develops that a ganav (thief) is one who refuses to take responsibility for his actions, sneaking rather than owning his deeds. The six-year servitude forces total compensation while simultaneously testing whether he learns to value responsibility or merely enjoys being cared for without obligation. The pierced ear at the end reveals whether he grasped that consequences must be reasonable—not terrorizing—for genuine responsibility to emerge.
Why does Parshas Mishpatim open with the obscure laws of a Hebrew servant, and why is this parsha part of the Sinai revelation? The shiur argues that theft—unlike robbery or battery—reflects a refusal to take responsibility for one's actions. By forcing immediate restitution through indentured servitude, the Torah rehabilitates the thief, teaching him to own his choices and take pride in making amends.
Why does the Torah forbid speaking truth about others? The shiur shows that lashon hara is "lo sisa shem shav" — a lie disguised as truth. By isolating one fact from its context, it creates a false portrait of who a person is. Lashon hara is driven not by pleasure but by pain — the emptiness of unrealized potential — making it more destructive to the soul than murder, idolatry, and adultery combined.
Why did Eisav and Yishmael reject Torah law when they already accepted Noahide prohibitions against murder and theft? The shiur develops the insight that Torah law begins with recognizing others' rights, while secular law focuses only on my restrictions. This rights-based perspective transforms how we approach all relationships and obligations.
Why does the Torah describe Jewish unity at the moment of camping, not at receiving the Torah? The shiur demonstrates from Rashi that "k'ish echad b'lev echad" (one man with one heart) means unity is not defined by shared religious conviction but by the ability to live together harmoniously. The focus on "neged hahar" (opposite the mountain) teaches that unity requires looking beyond oneself toward a higher purpose.
Why did the nations reject the Torah based on "do not murder" and "do not steal" when they were already obligated in these under the Noahide laws? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: the Seven Noahide Laws focus on what I am forbidden to do, but Torah law begins with the other person's rights—his right to life, property, and even to a loan. This shift from self-centered obligation to recognizing others' entitlements is the foundation of Jewish ethics and the basis for building a Torah community.
Why does the Torah place the Sanhedrin next to the altar? The shiur explores the ramp (not steps) leading to the altar as teaching non-self-awareness during divine service. Judges, like those serving at the altar, must transmit the law without personal discretion—pure servants, not principals—and true kindness requires focusing on others, not on our own spiritual growth.
Why does the Torah emphasize that fruits and vegetables have seeds when permitting Adam to eat them? Seeds represent the ability to replace what we consume. This shiur develops the principle that berachos create a dual obligation: asking permission from Hashem and replacing what we take from the world, ensuring resources for future generations.
Why can't a non-Jew understand Torah even in areas of law (mishpatim) common to all mankind? The shiur develops the principle that gentile law focuses on societal order (kiyum habriah), while Torah law focuses on what's right for each individual (kiyum hayachid). Bris milah creates a personal covenant that enables this individual-focused perspective, distinguishing Jewish mishpatim from the parallel seven Noahide laws.
Why does Jewish law require such extraordinary meticulousness in monetary cases (dinim) but not in ritual law like Shabbos or kosher? The shiur explains that dinim deal with *rights*—the Torah confers actual ownership and entitlement. Taking away someone's right demands absolute certainty. The deeper point: rights exist so we can *give them away* for shalom—compromise (pshara) is the highest expression of ownership.
Why does the Torah call a purchased Jew an "eved ivri" before he's actually enslaved? The shiur develops a yesod from Avrohom Avinu's journey through idolatry: past failures—even sinful ones—can be retroactively sanctified when used to empower future growth. This principle transforms how we support family members through setbacks.
Why did Klal Yisrael need coercion at Har Sinai after already declaring "Naaseh v'nishma"? The shiur argues that naaseh v'nishma means "we shall do and it will be understood"—the mitzvos themselves reveal that they are our ultimate self-fulfillment, not imposed burdens. This reframes the entire covenant as an act of shleimus (wholeness), making us b'nei b'chori Yisrael.
Can someone be religiously observant yet untrustworthy in business? A Gemara in Kiddushin 40a categorizes four types of people: good to God and good to people (tzaddik tov), good to God but bad to people (tzaddik she'eino tov), bad to both (rasha ra - including a ganav), and bad to God but good to people (rasha). The shiur explains that mitzvos bein adam l'chaveiro require not just compliance but genuine caring—the recipient must feel valued, not merely an object of obligation.
Does going to doctors contradict relying on Hashem as our healer? The Ramban holds medicine is a concession for those not on high spiritual levels, while the Rambam views medicine as a science—a domain Hashem established. The shiur resolves this by explaining that illness uniquely separates a person from Hashem, making self-cure through teshuvah impossible and necessitating medical intervention.
Why does the Torah forbid kohanim from taking large steps on the altar ramp? The shiur explores the Toras Kohanim's connection between "lo sigaleh ervascha" and the prohibition against psi'os gasos (large steps). Taking large steps creates an awareness of one's physicality—a bizayon in a makom kodesh—and parallels the requirement in din not to make logical leaps, where self-awareness and presumption replace rigorous step-by-step reasoning.
Why does the Torah juxtapose the law against building steps to the altar with the opening laws of Mishpatim concerning judges? The shiur argues that taking large steps creates awareness of one's physicality, which compromises spiritual focus. Similarly, a judge must avoid self-awareness and personal agenda—including taking bribes "for fairness"—because self-focus blinds him to truth and objectivity.
Why does the Torah forbid charging interest on loans to Jews while commanding interest on loans to gentiles? The shiur distinguishes two frameworks: loans to the poor are structured charity preserving the borrower's dignity, while loans to the financially stable reflect brotherhood—neither context permits interest. The word "im" (if) teaches that interpersonal mitzvos must be performed as if voluntary, making the recipient feel personally cared for rather than merely fulfilling an obligation.
Why does the Torah prohibit a judge from accepting a bribe even when the litigant claims he only wants the truth? The shiur explains that true judicial corruption comes not from the left but from the right—the litigant who presents himself as righteous. Drawing on a Medrash about Esav blinding Yitzchok with his pious questions, Rabbi Zweig reveals that shochad works by making a judge believe one party is a tzaddik, thereby preventing the impartial skepticism required for justice.
Why does the Torah begin Mishpatim with the laws of the Hebrew servant? The shiur develops a foundational insight: a thief who steals more than his six-year earning potential seeks results without actualizing himself—he wants wealth without responsibility. The Torah's remedy is servitude, forcing him to confront the consequences of rejecting self-actualization, the very essence of being a Jew.
Why is the Torah called "Toras Moshe" when Moshe received it from Hashem? The shiur analyzes a Midrash Tanchuma that distinguishes between Moshe's mesirus nefesh for Mishpatim versus the rest of Torah. It explores whether the defining act was killing the Egyptian, the forty days on Sinai, teaching Torah, or "im ayin mecheni na" after the Chet HaEgel—and what each answer reveals about Moshe's unique bond with Klal Yisrael.
Why does the Torah forbid charging interest, and why use conditional language about lending? The shiur argues that the primary obligation is giving gifts to those in need, with loans serving only to preserve the borrower's dignity. This explains why interest is forbidden - there's no 'payment for waiting' when you've mentally given the money as a gift.
Why does Torah forbid charging interest when both lender and borrower would feel more comfortable with it? The shiur presents a fundamental yesod: when lending to a Jew, the starting point is an obligation to gift money. The loan structure exists solely to preserve the borrower's dignity. Since the lender should view it as a gift, charging for "waiting" (ribbis) contradicts the mitzvah's essence.
Why does the Torah use the word "im" (if) when commanding us to lend money, suggesting it's optional when it's actually obligatory? The shiur develops the principle that interpersonal mitzvos must be performed not merely as obligations, but with genuine caring and sensitivity—as if we desire to do them. This explains why lending money should psychologically be treated as a gift (even though structured as a loan for the borrower's dignity), why there's no berachah on tzedakah, and why charging interest to a fellow Jew is forbidden.
Why does Parshas Mishpatim begin with the laws of an Eved Ivri? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: mishpatim represent rights, and all rights derive from responsibility. Just as the right to eat requires replacing what we take (through brachos), the right to exist demands we be a positive force in creation. The eved-adon relationship becomes the prototype—mastery comes only through accepting responsibility—explaining both the opening of Mishpatim and the covenant of Yetzias Mitzrayim.
Why does the Torah mandate compromise in civil disputes when it already provides detailed laws? The shiur develops a yesod that compromise is not surrender—it's the mutual recognition of each party's legitimate rights. True shalom emerges when both sides feel entitled, not when each grudgingly gives up half to make the problem disappear.
Why does stealing an ox incur a five-fold penalty while a sheep only four-fold? The shiur builds on Rabbi Meir's principle that the Torah values work itself—not just its economic output—because meaningful work is essential to human fulfillment. Without avodas Hashem as the organizing principle, even productive work becomes etzev (painful toil), leaving people with accomplishment but not fulfillment.
Why does stealing an ox require five-fold payment while stealing a sheep only four-fold? The shiur develops a chiddush that work has two distinct values: monetary productivity (reflected in price) and the existential need to work itself. The fifth payment compensates for depriving someone of meaningful activity—revealing why the Torah uses the same word (etzev) for both "work" and "pain."
Why does the Torah present two seemingly contradictory versions of Matan Torah—one filled with fear and awe, the other with eating and celebration? The shiur resolves this by distinguishing between "na'aseh" (pure obedience without understanding) and "na'aseh v'nishmah" (commitment coupled with intellectual engagement). Through na'aseh v'nishmah, the Jewish people didn't merely become servants but became God's children—connected to eternal truth and thereby creators of their own divine identity.
Why does Shemos 23:25 say "He will bless your bread" when the Gemara (Berachos 48b) derives from it that *you* must bless? Rabbi Zweig develops a yesod that berachah has two components: asking permission (logical, related to theft) and asking Hashem to replenish what we consume (derived from the pasuk). This second dimension—rooted in the principle that Hashem created everything with seeds—teaches cosmic responsibility for future generations.
What does it mean to be "good to God and bad to people"? The shiur develops a chiddush from Kiddushin 40a: it's not the religious hypocrite who steals—that's evil to both God and people. Rather, it's someone who does all the right mitzvos but only because God commanded them, without genuine feeling for the recipient. Parshas Mishpatim's mitzvah of lending money illustrates this: the Torah uses the ambiguous word "im" to teach that we must lend in a way that preserves the borrower's dignity and reflects true care, not mere religious compliance.
Why does the Torah prohibit accepting "false statements" when lashon hara consists of true facts? The shiur develops the principle that lashon hara, though factually accurate, distorts reality by presenting incomplete information. Listening to lashon hara validates the speaker's insecurity—making the listener's sin worse than the speaker's. The person we criticize is actually someone we deeply admire but feel threatened by.
Why does the Torah phrase lending money conditionally—"If you lend"—when it's an obligation? The shiur explores a Midrash teaching that wealth, power, and wisdom are genuinely ours to enjoy, but precisely because they're ours, they make us threats to others. Lending money—which offers minimal personal benefit—is the litmus test proving we'll use our gifts to help rather than dominate.
Why is listening to lashon hara worse than speaking it? The shiur explains that the listener validates the speaker's insecurities, helping complete the aveira. Lashon hara stems not from hatred but from one's own insecurity—the person we speak against is often someone we deeply admire, making them the greatest potential for friendship once insecurity is resolved.
What distinguishes Torah law from secular legal systems, even when their outcomes are identical? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: Noahide law aims at societal survival, while Torah law establishes absolute individual rights. This explains why going to secular court is chilul Hashem, why bribery includes even a righteous person's gift, and why the entire Torah depends on Mishpatim establishing that each Jew has intrinsic worth.
Why does the Torah call a Jewish servant an "Eved Ivri" rather than using a name that reflects Sinai? The shiur develops that becoming an Eved Ivri reflects a pre-Sinai mentality—a rejection of personal responsibility. The mitzvah of shiluach avadim (sending the servant free after six years) reflects our acceptance of Sinai: we must ensure others embrace freedom and responsibility, not remain enslaved.
Why does the Torah begin the social-justice laws with the obscure case of a Jewish slave, using the puzzling phrase "eved ivri" that seems both redundant and grammatically wrong? The shiur argues that theft uniquely reflects a slave mentality—avoiding responsibility—and only such a person can be enslaved. The ear-piercing ceremony teaches that consequences must be understood as justified to create genuine responsibility, not mere compliance through fear.
Why does the Gemara in Brachos derive the obligation to make brachos from a pasuk when logic already dictates it? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: brachos serve two purposes—requesting permission from Hashem and obligating us to replenish what we consume from the universe. This explains why Seder Zeraim is so named and why not making brachos reflects ultimate self-centeredness, comparable to Yeravam ben Nevat.
Why are there two parallel accounts of Sinai—Yisro and Mishpatim—with such different moods? Parshas Yisro represents our commitment to God (tov lashamayim), while Parshas Mishpatim establishes our obligation to each other (tov labriyos). The social justice laws are not merely prohibitions from God; they are mishpatim—rights we owe each other, creating an organic unity that gives God's kingship its true power.
Why are the Jewish people, Torah, and Dinim each called "in Moshe's name"? The shiur develops a single yesod across all three: Moshe linked his own fate to theirs—returning to Egypt, saying "mecheini na" at the Eigel, and teaching Mishpatim with exhaustive effort to reach every mind. Mesirus nefesh means becoming their servant, not just their teacher.
Why was the Mishkan commanded after Na'aseh V'Nishma, and why are its vessels fundamentally wood rather than gold? Wood represents humanity's capacity to resist divine will - our greatest gift and danger. Na'aseh V'Nishma means choosing to let God's will become compelling while retaining the ability to resist, creating human space worthy of divine presence.
Why does the Torah present two seemingly contradictory accounts of Matan Torah—Yisro depicts fear and trembling, Mishpatim a celebration? The shiur develops that these represent two distinct modes of receiving the Torah: Yisro establishes unilateral obligation (employee-employer), while Mishpatim creates a covenant making Jews principals in creation with eternal rights and partnership with Hashem.
Why don't we make brachos on interpersonal mitzvos like charity or visiting the sick? The shiur develops the principle that bein adam l'chavero means others have actual rights upon us, not just that they receive our actions. Making a bracha would signal we're acting only for God's sake, violating the person's right to feel genuinely cared for.
What distinguishes mishpatim from other mitzvos, and why do courts seek compromise when Torah law seems clear? Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental yesod: bein adam l'chavero means the other person has a *right* and a *claim* on you, not merely that your action affects them. This transforms every violation into a personal injury, making compromise essential to restore relationships beyond monetary restitution.
Why does the Torah call idolatry "the mistake of the nations" rather than "strange gods"? The shiur argues that idol worship is rooted in a desire for ritual self-expression, not true acceptance of divine authority. It then shows that oppressing a convert, widow, or orphan is not merely violating a law—it's a personal attack on God Himself, akin to rebellion (maris ba'alchas), which is why the Torah responds with charon af.
Why did Klal Yisrael say "na'aseh v'nishma" when they'd already committed to "kol asher diber Hashem na'aseh"? The shiur argues that na'aseh v'nishma reveals a deeper level: not just compliance with God's will, but understanding that Torah fulfills our own essence. The nishma—the internalization—distinguishes a ben Torah from someone merely trained in Torah habits.
Why does a ganav (thief) pay double while a gazlan (robber) pays only what he took? A ganav derives his self-worth from others' opinions, not from God or even himself—he knows the stolen money isn't his, yet feels validated when people think he's wealthy. This reveals someone who is fundamentally a slave, lacking internal self-esteem, which is why the Torah mandates he be sold as an eved ivri—to confront and hopefully restore his sense of self.
Why does the Torah use conditional language ('if you lend money') for obligatory mitzvos? The shiur identifies three such cases and develops the yesod that mitzvos must be performed with genuine desire, not grudging compliance. Conditional phrasing teaches that while obligation is absolute, proper performance comes from joy and authentic choice rather than duress.
Why must employers give parting gifts to Jewish servants and treat them as material equals during service? The Torah protects both parties: gifts restore the servant's dignity after years of demeaning personal service, while equal treatment prevents masters from developing dangerous feelings of superiority over those who serve them.
Why does the Torah use "if" (im) when commanding us to lend money, build a mizbe'ach, and bring the omer offering—three clear obligations? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: Torah, avodah, and gemilus chasadim must ultimately be performed because we *want* to do them, not merely out of obligation. This transforms mitzvos from sources of stress into vehicles of personal fulfillment and connection.
Why does the Torah mandate a fivefold payment for stealing an ox but only fourfold for a sheep? The shiur develops a fundamental insight from the Gemara's phrase "gadol koach ha-shelo melachah"—that work itself has absolute value beyond mere financial loss. This principle reveals that people are measured not by accomplishments or talents, but solely by the intelligent effort they invest.
How does the Jewish people achieve true unity? The shiur distinguishes two levels of derech eretz: basic social cooperation (possible before Torah) versus genuine achdus rooted in serving Hashem together. Parshas Mishpatim's juxtaposition with Matan Torah reveals that Jewish social justice is not merely ethical regulation but a form of avodas Hashem—which is why the Sanhedrin sat near the Mizbeach.
Why does the Torah write "if you lend money" when lending is obligatory? The conditional language teaches that interpersonal mitzvos must be performed from genuine care, not duty. This explains why blessings aren't made on mitzvos between people - emphasizing divine command would make recipients uncomfortable and defeat the mitzvah's purpose of preserving human dignity.
Why does Torah prohibit going to secular courts even when they would rule identically to Jewish courts? The Bach's insight reveals that the First Temple was destroyed because people treated Torah law as merely optimal social policy rather than recognizing justice as our vehicle for connecting to Hashem. Every Jewish court ruling vindicates Divine honor, not just human rights.
Why does Torah law require a civil court system if Hashem already knows all wrongdoing? The shiur develops the principle that Jewish courts don't merely adjudicate rights between parties—they vindicate Hashem's law. Restitution addresses the victim's loss, but the court process itself creates an eternal connection between man and God, transforming mundane disputes into spiritual encounters.
Why does Rashi say a dog is more honored than a non-Jew? The shiur develops a profound yesod: a kafui tov—one who takes without giving—is spiritually dead. The rejection of Torah at Sinai transformed the nations into takers who sever connection with Hashem and community, creating an internal death worse than being abused.
What connects idol worship, oppressing the convert, and exploiting the widow and orphan? Rabbi Zweig develops a bold thesis: all three involve ratzeach—a form of murder or violence against God Himself. The Torah prescribes death by sword (yochrom) for the idolater and promises that those who exploit the defenseless will see their own families rendered utterly helpless, measure for measure.
Why does the Torah use feminine language for the prohibition against witchcraft (mechashefa lo s'chayeh)? The shiur develops the thesis that kishuf (witchcraft) represents an intrinsic connection to death and separation from God. Since women have a deeper metaphysical connection to death through their biology and spiritual role, they dominate this realm—making them the "active party" the Torah addresses directly.
Why does the Torah split the laws of murder across three pesukim (21:12-14), inserting the laws of accidental killing between them? The shiur develops the yesod that murder operates on two distinct legal theories: the court's authority (requiring full due process) and the king's authority (protecting society and divine sovereignty). This dual framework explains why murder alone empowers the Jewish king to execute even without standard halachic requirements.
Why does the Torah present two seemingly contradictory accounts of the Sinai revelation, one in Parshas Yisro and one in Parshas Mishpatim? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: Yisro describes the original plan where Bnei Yisrael would hear through Moshe, while Mishpatim records what happened after they demanded "ritzoneinu liros es malkeinu"—to hear directly from Hashem like Moshe did, achieving a prophecy with full bodily faculties rather than prophetic trance.
Why does the Torah introduce Parshas Mishpatim with "Ve'eileh HaMishpatim" instead of "Eileh," and what does it reveal about the status of an eved ivri? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: an eved ivri must completely revert to his original status after six years, untainted by his servitude. This explains why the Torah uses "begapo" (with his body alone) and forbids a shifcha kena'anis to an unmarried eved—the Torah creates a structure ensuring total rehabilitation.
Why does the Torah repeat "an eye for an eye" in both Exodus and Leviticus, and what does this phrase actually mean? The shiur develops the principle that injuring a person violates two distinct dimensions: the victim's individual rights and the tzelem Elokim (divine image) embodied in every human being. This dual framework explains why physical harm deserves consequences far beyond monetary compensation.
Why does the Torah repeat the law of "an eye for an eye" in both Mishpatim and Emor? Rabbi Zweig develops two distinct theories underlying capital punishment. One: striking a Jew is striking the Shechina itself—an attack on God. Two: taking a life forfeits one's own right to exist. The difference between Jewish and Noahide law reflects whether execution protects society or safeguards individual rights.
Why does the Torah write "an eye for an eye" if it means monetary payment? The Rambam explains that physical injury deserves physical punishment — payment is a kofer, a redemption for losing one's own limb, not compensation. True justice requires restoring the victim's dignity through middah k'neged middah, teaching that putting someone down — physically or verbally — means we deserve the same.
Why does the Torah present two seemingly contradictory accounts of Sinai—the fearful imposition in Parshas Yisro versus the festive covenant in Parshas Mishpatim? The shiur develops that Yisro represents unilateral obligation ("Naaseh"), while Mishpatim's bris creates an achdus where Torah becomes our ultimate fulfillment ("Naaseh V'Nishma"). Only through the bris does the decree of death cease and true conversion occur.
Why does one Mishna in Avos say honor your friend like yourself while another says honor him like your rebbe? The shiur builds on the Kuzari's teaching that Matan Torah created a new level of existence—Yisrael—and explains that the two Mishnayos describe two distinct types of friendship: surface-level connections versus life-giving Torah bonds that merge identities and connect us to Hashem.
What does it mean to be responsible to oneself, not just to God or others? The shiur develops a foundational yesod that Mishpatim represents ben adam l'atzmo—obligations a person owes to himself. Through the parshah of eved ivri (Hebrew slave), the shiur reveals that a thief lacks self-responsibility, and his servitude is designed to teach him accountability, culminating in the ear-piercing of the eved nirtzah who refuses to accept responsibility even after six years.
What distinguishes mishpatim from other mitzvos? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: mishpatim recognize pre-existing rights in others, not merely prohibitions for the actor. A Jew forbidden to steal must internalize that his friend has a right to property; a Gentile under the Noahide laws need only refrain from acting. This difference—empathy versus self-control—explains why going to secular courts constitutes avodah zarah even when they apply identical law, and why the Torah became "surrounded by mishpatim" at Marah and Sinai.
Why do laws about capital punishment and damages appear to repeat between Mishpatim and Emor? The repetition reveals two distinct dimensions of Jewish law: social justice based on proportional compensation versus recognition that every Jew is tzelem Elokim. Understanding both dimensions explains why attacking any Jew constitutes an attack on the Shechinah itself.
Why does the Torah present Matan Torah twice, with two starkly different moods—the fear and imposition of Parshas Yisro versus the intimacy and eating of Parshas Mishpatim? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: Yisro depicts the unilateral imposition of mitzvos (lo si'al isha), while Mishpatim describes the brit, a bilateral covenant creating Yisrael v'Oraisa v'Kudsha Brich Hu chad. Both dimensions are essential to understanding Kabbalas HaTorah.
Why does the Torah begin its mishpatim with the laws of the eved Ivri, a law not yet applicable in the desert? The shiur develops a profound yesod: a ganav is fundamentally an eved—someone who rejects responsibility for himself, even for basic livelihood. The six-year servitude aims to restore his sense of responsibility and tzuras adam, making eved Ivri the perfect introduction to mishpatim, which are all about growth through accepting responsibility.
Why does the Torah present two different accounts of Matan Torah in Parshas Yisro and Mishpatim, with completely different moods and missing details? Yisro describes a unilateral divine imposition with fear and trepidation (kaf aleihem har k'gigis), while Mishpatim depicts a festive bris ceremony with korbanos, blood sprinkling, and reading the Sefer HaBris. The shiur explains that both dimensions—hechrach (obligation) and achdus (covenant partnership)—are essential to Jewish identity.
Why does Parshas Mishpatim immediately follow Maamad Har Sinai? The shiur develops that Yisro represents absolute subjugation—naaseh without reasons—while Mishpatim introduces the recognition of intrinsic human rights and zulato (the other). This transforms Torah observance from mere obedience into relationship, but only after the commitment of Yisro is firmly established first.
Why does the Torah present two versions of Matan Torah — one in Yisro and one in Mishpatim? The shiur distinguishes between dibur/Elokim (imposition of Divine authority) and amira/Hashem (intimate communication). Mishpatim represents an elevation: only after absolute commitment through yirah can meaningful relationship and understanding emerge.
Why does the Torah command "an eye for an eye" if it means monetary payment? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: property damage can be restored through payment (shalem), but personal injury cannot—money never replaces a limb. Therefore, the Torah frames personal injury as a criminal act deserving punishment, not a civil matter deserving compensation. This distinction preserves moral deterrence and prevents the dangerous illusion that harm can be "paid off."
