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May one light a Chanukah (חנוכה) candle from another Chanukah candle? The Gemara (גמרא) in Shabbos (שבת) 22a prohibits lighting 'ner laner' but permits 'mishragah leshragah,' raising questions about when using one mitzvah (מצוה) object for another constitutes bizui mitzvah versus proper hiddur.
This shiur provides an extensive analysis of Masechta Shabbos (שבת) 22a, focusing on the fundamental question of whether one may light one Chanukah (חנוכה) candle from another candle. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement 'ein madlikin ner laner' (we do not light from candle to candle) and the reasoning behind this prohibition. The shiur explores two primary rationales offered by the Gemara: bizui mitzvah (מצוה) (disgracing the mitzvah) and the concept of osur leshamesh leora (forbidden to use for light). Rabbi Zweig delves into Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that the prohibition stems from the appearance of taking away light and oil from the mitzvah candle, which diminishes its status as a ner mitzvah. He contrasts this with Rabbeinu Chananel's understanding, examining whether the issue is one of immediately fulfilling the mitzvah versus lighting something that will eventually become a mitzvah candle. The shiur addresses the practical distinction between using a kesum (wood chip) versus mishragah leshragah (candle to candle), with the Gemara permitting the latter while prohibiting the former. Rabbi Zweig analyzes whether this applies only between different people's menorahs or even within one's own menorah when adding additional candles. The discussion extends to the fundamental nature of the prohibition - whether it's an issur (prohibition) of leshamesh leora or specifically a din of bizui mitzvah, and how these concepts interact with the requirement to have a shamash (helper candle) to maintain the heker (recognition) that the menorah is for mitzvah purposes. The shiur concludes by examining how this halacha (הלכה) relates to broader principles of kavod hamitzvah (honoring the mitzvah) and the tension between using mitzvah objects for additional mitzvah purposes.
Shabbos 22a
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