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Why does the Torah (תורה) add 'and you shall fear your God' to specific interpersonal mitzvos like giving bad advice or charging interest? The phrase targets situations where victims don't know they're being harmed, revealing that these actions corrupt our own tzelem Elokim even when no external damage occurs. True interpersonal mitzvos require developing genuine feelings for others, not just mechanical compliance with divine commands.
This shiur examines a fundamental principle in Jewish ethics through the recurring phrase "v'yareisa mei'Elokeicha" (and you shall fear your God) that appears in various Torah (תורה) commandments. Rabbi Zweig analyzes three primary cases where this phrase appears: the prohibition against giving bad advice (lo sonu), the laws of lending with interest (ribbis), and showing respect to Torah scholars and elders. The core question addressed is why the Torah adds "v'yareisa mei'Elokeicha" to these particular mitzvos. Using Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary extensively, the shiur reveals that these are situations where the recipient doesn't know they're being harmed or disrespected - making them "victimless crimes" on the surface. For example, when giving someone bad advice that benefits the advisor, or lending money at interest while claiming it belongs to a non-Jew, the recipient remains unaware and even happy with the arrangement.
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Vayikra 25:36-37 (ribbis), Vayikra 19:14 (lo sonu), Vayikra 19:32 (standing for elders)
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