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What type of impediment exempts someone from the obligation to provide mezonos after higia zman? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between true oness (force majeure) on the marriage itself versus mere discomfort when certain aspects cannot be performed together. The analysis reveals that even when one can technically fulfill the primary obligation, significant associated discomfort may still create an exemption.
Rabbi Zweig analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 2b regarding the parameters of oness (circumstances beyond one's control) in the context of higia zman obligations. The Gemara (גמרא) presents an apparent contradiction: one source suggests that a sick person (choleh) is exempt from mezonos obligations, while another indicates they remain obligated. The resolution centers on timing—whether the oness occurred before or after the obligation took effect. The shiur explores Tosafos (תוספות)' approach that distinguishes between ongoing daily obligations versus a one-time obligation of mezonos that remains in effect even if circumstances change later. According to this view, once higia zman creates the mezonos obligation, subsequent illness doesn't eliminate it, similar to how a married man remains obligated to support his wife even if he becomes ill.
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Kesubos 2b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
