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What type of impediment exempts someone from the obligation to provide mezonos after higia zman? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between true oness (force majeure) on the marriage itself versus mere discomfort when certain aspects cannot be performed together. The analysis reveals that even when one can technically fulfill the primary obligation, significant associated discomfort may still create an exemption.
Rabbi Zweig analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 2b regarding the parameters of oness (circumstances beyond one's control) in the context of higia zman obligations. The Gemara (גמרא) presents an apparent contradiction: one source suggests that a sick person (choleh) is exempt from mezonos obligations, while another indicates they remain obligated. The resolution centers on timing—whether the oness occurred before or after the obligation took effect. The shiur explores Tosafos (תוספות)' approach that distinguishes between ongoing daily obligations versus a one-time obligation of mezonos that remains in effect even if circumstances change later. According to this view, once higia zman creates the mezonos obligation, subsequent illness doesn't eliminate it, similar to how a married man remains obligated to support his wife even if he becomes ill.
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Kesubos 2b
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