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Can Beis Din execute someone with any of the four death penalties when unable to carry out the specific prescribed method? Tosafot and Rambam (רמב"ם) disagree whether this flexibility applies universally or only in cases of resistance, revealing a fundamental dispute about whether Beis Din's primary obligation is removal of evil or providing proper atonement.
This comprehensive analysis of Makkos 2a examines the principle of 'makdimin lo'osa misa' - giving someone the death penalty they were sentenced to receive. The shiur begins with Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation that witnesses (zomemim) receive the same punishment they intended to impose, then explores Tosafot's interpretation that if Beis Din cannot carry out the prescribed death penalty, they may substitute any of the four death penalties. A major difficulty emerges: the Gemara (גמרא) states that only regarding murderers and certain other specific cases can alternative death penalties be used, following the principle of 'shnei kesuvim haba'im ke'echad ein melamdin' (two verses teaching the same thing do not teach a general rule). Yet here, Tosafot seems to apply this flexibility universally.
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Makkos 2a
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