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When does kluta k'mishun chadami (placement is like removal) apply to objects held in one's hand? The shiur resolves an apparent contradiction in Tosafos (תוספות) by distinguishing based on intent: when someone wants to move the object elsewhere, their control prevents true 'placement,' but when they intend to place it down locally, yado basar gufo limits the principle across different domains.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Masechta Shabbos (שבת) 4a dealing with the principle of kluta k'mishun chadami (placement is like removing) and its application when objects are held in one's hand. The discussion centers on an apparent contradiction in Tosafos (תוספות) between two cases: in our Mishna, Tosafos says that when something is in someone's hand, we don't say kluta k'mishun chadami, but in another case (Daf Gimmel), Tosafos suggests we would say kluta k'mishun chadami unless the hand and body are in different reshuyot (domains). The Rav analyzes the Tosafos HaRosh's two different explanations for why objects in one's hand don't follow kluta k'mishun chadami. The first explanation simply states that when something is in your hand, you don't apply this principle. The second explanation adds the concept of yado basar gufo (one's hand is like their body). The Rav proposes a novel resolution: kluta k'mishun chadami depends on intent and control. When someone holds an object and wants to move it elsewhere, since their hand controls where the object goes, we don't say kluta k'mishun chadami - the object isn't truly 'placed' anywhere because the hand determines its destination. However, when someone wants to place the object down in the current location, then we would say kluta k'mishun chadami, except for the principle of yado basar gufo when the hand and body are in different domains. This approach explains both the case of the oni (poor person) who receives something in his hand and immediately wants to take it out (no kluta k'mishun chadami because he doesn't want it there), and the case of someone throwing from one domain to another (potential kluta k'mishun chadami limited by yado basar gufo). The shiur then addresses a difficult Rashi (רש"י) regarding why Rabbi Akiva is only liable for one violation rather than two (akira and hanacha). While others might say this is due to toda b'makom echad (one offering for multiple violations in the same place), Rashi suggests a more fundamental approach: according to Rabbi Akiva, there is only one hanacha here, not a separate akira and hanacha sequence.
Shabbos 4a
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