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What is the melacha when blood flows from a bris milah? Tosfos challenges Rashi (רש"י)'s view that it's tzoveia (dyeing), arguing instead for netilas neshama (taking a soul). The discussion reveals fundamental questions about psik reisha and whether certain melachos require specific intent.
The shiur analyzes the Talmudic debate regarding the nature of the melacha involved when blood flows during bris milah. Rashi (רש"י) maintains that the prohibition is tzoveia (dyeing), as the blood colors the cloth or surrounding area. Tosfos challenges this position, arguing that the melacha should be classified as netilas neshama (taking a soul) since the act involves removing life force from the person. Tosfos develops his argument by distinguishing between different types of blood removal. When performing metzitza (the sucking of blood after circumcision), the intent is clearly therapeutic - to help the child heal and prevent danger. This cannot be netilas neshama in the sense of weakening the person, since the goal is actually to strengthen and heal. Therefore, Tosfos argues that this should not be considered a Torah (תורה)-level prohibition but rather a rabbinic one.
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Kesubos 5b
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