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Must one be an expert to prohibit something upon oneself through shavi nafshecha tichle misura? The shiur analyzes competing approaches in Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding whether personal conviction suffices for self-imposed prohibitions, or if external validation of expertise is required.
This shiur explores a fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the requirements for the principle of shavi nafshecha tichle misura (one may prohibit something upon oneself). The discussion centers on Kesubos 2a and connects to broader questions about personal authority in halachic determinations. Rashi maintains that for shavi nafshecha tichle misura to be effective, the person must actually be an expert (bakki) in the relevant area. According to this view, when Reb Elazar states that one who claims to have found pesach (פסח) pasuch (evidence of prior relations) renders the woman forbidden to him, the chidush is that we accept his expertise in recognizing pesach pasuch. The Gemara (גמרא)'s proof from our Mishna works because if he weren't truly expert, there would be no obligation to clarify the matter in beis din, since his testimony would be ignored.
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Kesubos 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
