A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Must one be an expert to prohibit something upon oneself through shavi nafshecha tichle misura? The shiur analyzes competing approaches in Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding whether personal conviction suffices for self-imposed prohibitions, or if external validation of expertise is required.
This shiur explores a fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the requirements for the principle of shavi nafshecha tichle misura (one may prohibit something upon oneself). The discussion centers on Kesubos 2a and connects to broader questions about personal authority in halachic determinations. Rashi maintains that for shavi nafshecha tichle misura to be effective, the person must actually be an expert (bakki) in the relevant area. According to this view, when Reb Elazar states that one who claims to have found pesach (פסח) pasuch (evidence of prior relations) renders the woman forbidden to him, the chidush is that we accept his expertise in recognizing pesach pasuch. The Gemara (גמרא)'s proof from our Mishna works because if he weren't truly expert, there would be no obligation to clarify the matter in beis din, since his testimony would be ignored.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 2a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
