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When can eidei zomemim be liable through hodos baal din or garmi instead of standard eid zomem penalties? The shiur develops distinctions between cases involving maisa hezek versus those lacking concrete harm. The Bach and Ramban (רמב"ן) offer competing frameworks for understanding when self-admission creates financial liability.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Makkos 3b, focusing on the complex halachic dynamics surrounding eidei zomemim (conspiring witnesses) and their financial obligations. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental question: when witnesses admit to false testimony, under what circumstances are they liable for payment? Rabbi Zweig examines multiple approaches from the Rishonim. The Bach suggests that when only one of two witnesses is proven false, the standard eid zomem mechanism doesn't apply since we cannot determine which witness is truthful. However, when a witness says "eidus sheker he'adeti" (I testified falsely), there exists hodos baal din (self-admission) that could create liability through garmi (indirect causation).
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Makkos 3b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
