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When can eidei zomemim be liable through hodos baal din or garmi instead of standard eid zomem penalties? The shiur develops distinctions between cases involving maisa hezek versus those lacking concrete harm. The Bach and Ramban (רמב"ן) offer competing frameworks for understanding when self-admission creates financial liability.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Makkos 3b, focusing on the complex halachic dynamics surrounding eidei zomemim (conspiring witnesses) and their financial obligations. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental question: when witnesses admit to false testimony, under what circumstances are they liable for payment? Rabbi Zweig examines multiple approaches from the Rishonim. The Bach suggests that when only one of two witnesses is proven false, the standard eid zomem mechanism doesn't apply since we cannot determine which witness is truthful. However, when a witness says "eidus sheker he'adeti" (I testified falsely), there exists hodos baal din (self-admission) that could create liability through garmi (indirect causation).
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Makkos 3b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
