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Does mitzvos ain tzrichas kavana mean no kavana is needed at all for mitzvah (מצוה) performance? The shiur develops a Rambam (רמב"ם)-based distinction: while specific kavana to fulfill the obligation isn't required, one must have awareness of performing a mitzvah act. This framework explains why eating matzah while thinking it's regular bread doesn't work, yet kaful parshiyot cases do.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of the fundamental principle of mitzvos ain tzrichas kavana through the lens of Gemara (גמרא) Pesachim 114b and related sources. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings in Hilchos Shofar regarding one who hears shofar without proper kavana, questioning the apparent contradiction between the principle that mitzvos don't require kavana and specific cases where kavana seems necessary. The core thesis developed is that the Rambam's understanding of mitzvos ain tzrichas kavana is more nuanced than commonly assumed. According to this interpretation, the principle doesn't mean that no kavana is required whatsoever, but rather that one doesn't need specific kavana to fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) (kavana l'yotzei). However, one must have awareness that they are performing a mitzvah act (ma'aseh mitzvah). This distinction explains various Rambam rulings, including why someone who eats matzah thinking it's regular bread on Pesach (פסח) night is not yotzei - not due to lack of kavana l'yotzei, but due to lack of awareness of performing the mitzvah.
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Pesachim 114b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
