A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
How can a woman who admits to relations be believed when she could have kept silent? The shiur explores the debate between migu (credibility based on what she could have said) and ma'alos b'yuchsin (stringency regarding lineage). Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) disagree on whether the Gemara (גמרא)'s case involves secluded relations or actual impropriety.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Kesubos 13b, focusing on the fundamental tension between migu and ma'alos b'yuchsin in determining a woman's credibility regarding her lineage status. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where witnesses saw a woman in a compromising situation, and there is disagreement between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamaliel about whether to believe her testimony. The central question revolves around the principle of migu - if a woman could have remained silent about improper relations (migu d'boy shasa - 'since she could have kept quiet'), why should we not believe her when she admits to relations but claims they were with a kosher person? Rabbi Zweig examines two primary interpretations: according to Ziri, the case involves a woman who was merely secluded (nistra) with a man, while according to Rav Asi, it involves a woman who was definitely intimate (nivla) with someone.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 13b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
