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How can a woman who admits to relations be believed when she could have kept silent? The shiur explores the debate between migu (credibility based on what she could have said) and ma'alos b'yuchsin (stringency regarding lineage). Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) disagree on whether the Gemara (גמרא)'s case involves secluded relations or actual impropriety.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Kesubos 13b, focusing on the fundamental tension between migu and ma'alos b'yuchsin in determining a woman's credibility regarding her lineage status. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where witnesses saw a woman in a compromising situation, and there is disagreement between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamaliel about whether to believe her testimony. The central question revolves around the principle of migu - if a woman could have remained silent about improper relations (migu d'boy shasa - 'since she could have kept quiet'), why should we not believe her when she admits to relations but claims they were with a kosher person? Rabbi Zweig examines two primary interpretations: according to Ziri, the case involves a woman who was merely secluded (nistra) with a man, while according to Rav Asi, it involves a woman who was definitely intimate (nivla) with someone.
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Kesubos 13b
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