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Why does the Rama rule that eating must stop at teisha shaos on Erev Pesach (פסח) but chatzos on Erev Sukkos (סוכות)? The shiur examines whether the difference stems from permitted food types or argues that the Rama actually holds chatzos for both. The analysis traces the sugya back to whether preserving appetite serves the korban Pesach or the matzah obligation itself.
Rabbi Zweig examines a fundamental question about when one must stop eating on the eves of major festivals. The Mechaber rules that on both Erev Pesach (פסח) and Erev Sukkos (סוכות), one must stop eating from chatzos (midday). However, the Rama disagrees regarding Erev Pesach, ruling that one only needs to stop from teisha shaos (the ninth hour/3 PM). This creates an apparent contradiction: if the Rama holds that Erev Pesach requires stopping only from teisha shaos, why does he agree with the Mechaber that on Erev Sukkos one must stop from chatzos? The Magen Avrohom raises this kashya and suggests that perhaps the difference lies in the type of food permitted: on Erev Pesach, only lighter foods are permitted, which require stopping only from teisha shaos to maintain appetite, while on Erev Sukkos, heavier foods like bread are permitted, requiring the earlier cutoff of chatzos. However, the Magen Avrohom himself questions this distinction, noting the lack of clear sources for such a differentiation.
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Pesachim 99b
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