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What constitutes onus (duress) when conditions in gittin or kiddushin are not fulfilled? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between two types of onus: where you simply cannot perform vs. where you want to perform but cannot. This analysis explains apparent contradictions in the Rambam (רמב"ם) and reconciles different positions.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the concept of onus (duress/circumstances beyond one's control) in the context of conditional gittin and kiddushin. The discussion begins with a question from the Chasam Sofer regarding a case in the Ittur where Talmidei Chachamim debated whether there is onus in kiddushin, and why this would create any practical problem for the rabbis. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach is examined in detail, particularly his statement that by gittin one must be able to claim 'onus hayisi' (I was under duress). The shiur analyzes what Rashi means by 'tainas onus' - the requirement to assert one's duress - and how this differs from simply being unable to perform an action. According to Rashi's reading, it's not sufficient to merely demonstrate that circumstances prevented performance; one must actively claim and substantiate the onus.
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Kesubos 2b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
