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The Sefer HaChinuch notes that while Torah (תורה) law governs how to divide inheritance, there's no obligation to leave one at all. This parallels the Gemara (גמרא)'s ruling that supporting children is only required until age 6-7. The deeper purpose is ensuring children recognize parental care stems from love, not legal duty.
This shiur examines a fascinating insight from the Sefer HaChinuch regarding the Torah (תורה)'s laws of inheritance found in Parshas Pinchas and codified in the eighth perek of Bava Basra, Yesh Nochlim. The Sefer HaChinuch points out what appears to be an anomaly: while the Torah provides detailed halachos about how to divide an inheritance (first to sons, then to daughters if no sons exist), there is actually no mitzvah (מצוה) requiring a person to leave an inheritance at all. The obligation is purely conditional - IF there is an inheritance, THEN these are the rules for distribution. The Sefer HaChinuch contrasts this with the practice among non-Jews of his era, where civil law mandated that people must leave inheritances to their children. This creates a paradox: Jews, who are known for their devotion to their children's welfare, have no legal obligation to provide inheritance, while non-Jews, who live more for the present moment, are legally required to provide for future generations.
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Bava Basra, Perek Yesh Nochlim
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