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Why does fruit soup sometimes get shehakol instead of borei pri ha'etz, while cooked vegetables keep borei pri ha'adama? The shiur distinguishes between borei pri ha'adama as a blessing on the land's produce versus borei pri ha'etz as a special blessing on fruit itself as Hashem (ה׳)'s treat. This explains why cultural cooking practices (derech) affect fruit blessings but not vegetable blessings.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Brachos 38a regarding blessings on cooked produce. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining a dispute about fruit soup - whether it retains the blessing of borei pri ha'etz or becomes shehakol. The Rosh holds that if it's the normal practice (derech) to eat something cooked, it retains its original blessing; otherwise it becomes shehakol. The shiur then explores what determines when something loses its status as a fruit through a detailed analysis of the Gemara in Sukkah regarding disqualified esrogim. Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary reveals that there are different levels of cooking - bishul (regular cooking) versus shalaka (overcooked), with only shalaka disqualifying an esrog. This leads to a fundamental question: what drives the din of borei pri ha'etz versus borei pri ha'adama? Rabbi Zweig proposes that borei pri ha'adama is a blessing on what the land produces, while borei pri ha'etz is a special blessing specifically on the fruit itself - not just on the produce of the tree, but on the concept of fruit as a special treat from Hashem (ה׳). This explains why cultural practices (derech) matter more for fruits than vegetables. The analysis includes a complex discussion of why it's generally not the derech to cook fruits - because fruits often contain juice which is considered a separate 'fruit' that would be ruined by cooking. The shiur concludes by examining apparent contradictions between the laws of esrog and the laws of blessings, showing how something can be considered a fruit for one halacha (הלכה) but not another, since these are fundamentally different dinim with different requirements.
Brachos 38a
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