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Why does the Mishna forbid eating on erev Pesach (פסח) 'until dark' - what changes at nighttime? The shiur argues that during the day, rabbinic restrictions apply because people resist obligations they're not yet bound by. Once night arrives and the Torah (תורה) obligation takes effect, individuals bear direct responsibility to eat matzah le'teiavon - meaning with satisfaction, not necessarily hunger.
This shiur focuses on a challenging passage in Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the Mishna's statement 'lo yochal adam erev Pesach (פסח) ad shetechshach' (a person should not eat on erev Pesach until it gets dark). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining why the Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah omits the phrase 'ad shetechshach' when codifying this law, suggesting this indicates a fundamental difference in understanding. The main discussion centers on Tosafos's two difficult questions: first, regarding the meaning of 'lo yochal' in light of the established halacha (הלכה) permitting betzekel shel nochri at night, and second, why the Mishna needs to specify 'ad shetechshach' at all. Tosafos answers that there's a distinction between eating during the same meal (oso seudah) versus eating separately - within the same meal one can trust oneself to leave room for eating matzah with proper appetite (le'teiavon). Rabbi Zweig develops an innovative interpretation that fundamentally reframes the entire discussion. He argues that the word 'adam' in the Mishna is crucial - it addresses the natural human resistance to rabbinic restrictions when one is not yet obligated in the mitzvah (מצוה). During erev Pesach (daytime), when a person is not yet obligated in eating matzah, the Rabbis impose restrictions to ensure proper preparation. However, once night arrives and the Torah (תורה) obligation of eating matzah le'teiavon takes effect, there is no separate rabbinic prohibition. At night, the responsibility lies entirely with the individual to fulfill the Torah requirement properly. This leads to a redefinition of le'teiavon based on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of oso seudah. Rather than requiring actual hunger, le'teiavon means eating while one can still derive satisfaction from food - not being completely satiated (kol sovo). The permission for betzekel shel nochri within the same meal demonstrates that modest eating is permitted as long as one maintains the ability to enjoy the matzah. Rabbi Zweig contrasts this with the requirements for Shabbos (שבת) and Yom Tov meals, where the obligation is for an actual seudah requiring greater appetite, versus the Pesach matzah which requires only that eating still provide satisfaction. This framework explains the Rambam's approach - he codifies only the erev Pesach restriction because the nighttime guidelines flow directly from the Torah obligation of le'teiavon, requiring no separate rabbinic legislation. The shiur concludes with implications for practical observance, clarifying that the goal is not starvation but ensuring that matzah eating remains pleasurable and meaningful.
Pesachim 99b
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