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May a Jew buy chametz for a non-Jew using the non-Jew's money during Pesach (פסח) without violating bal yeira'eh? The Rivash permits it because the Jew's primary obligation is returning money, not guarding chametz - creating only indirect monetary liability (davar gorem l'mamon) rather than prohibited possession.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Pesachim 6a, focusing on the complex principle of 'Davar HaGorem LiMamon' (something that causes monetary obligation) in the context of chametz on Pesach (פסח). The discussion centers on a responsum from the Rivash addressing whether a Jew may purchase chametz for a non-Jew using the non-Jew's money during Pesach, and the resulting liability for bal yeira'eh u'val yimatzei (the prohibitions against seeing and possessing chametz). Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental dispute between the Rivash and the Mishna Melachim regarding the nature of agency relationships with non-Jews (shlichut l'akum). The Rivash argues that since there is no valid agency relationship, the Jew effectively purchases the chametz for himself and then transfers it, creating a violation. However, the Mishna Melachim challenges this reasoning, questioning why the outcome differs based on whether the chametz belongs to the original seller (A) versus the non-Jewish buyer (C). The shiur delves into the Magen Avrohom's position regarding a shomer (guardian) who fails to sell another Jew's chametz before Pesach, becoming a posheia (negligent party) and thereby liable for damages. This creates a 'davar gorem l'mamon' situation where the guardian's possession of the chametz indirectly causes financial obligation. The analysis contrasts this with the Chok Yaakov's opposing view that no liability exists in such cases. A crucial distinction emerges between two types of responsibility: direct achrayut (guardianship obligation) for watching an object versus indirect monetary obligation. The Rivash's position is explained through this lens - when the Jew receives money from a non-Jew, his primary obligation is to return the money, not to guard the resulting bread, thus avoiding the chametz prohibition. Rabbi Zweig connects this to broader principles in Jewish law, including the nature of hekdesh (consecrated property) and the distinction between object-based versus obligation-based liability. The discussion concludes by exploring how these principles relate to the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Ra'avad's dispute regarding forced guardianship, ultimately revealing fundamental questions about the nature of monetary obligation and possession in Jewish law.
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Pesachim 6a
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