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What role does intent play in defining forbidden labor on Shabbos (שבת)? The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos discusses whether drawing blood from a bride constitutes a melacha based on one's kavana - for the blood itself versus for marital relations. The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between subjective motivation and objective accomplishment in hilchot Shabbos.
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 5b which discusses the halachic status of drawing blood from a bride on Shabbos (שבת). The central question revolves around whether this action constitutes a forbidden melacha, and how the person's intent (kavana) affects the halachic determination. The Gemara presents a fundamental tension: if someone draws blood from his bride, is this permitted because his intent is for marital relations (hana'at atzmo), or is it forbidden because objectively he is performing acts that could constitute melachot - either extracting blood (dam) or creating an opening (pesach (פסח))? Rabbi Zweig notes a crucial difficulty: if the permissibility depends on what the person wants, why doesn't the Gemara simply state that those who intend the blood are permitted while those who intend the pesach are forbidden?
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Kesubos 5b
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