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Why isn't closing a door with a deer inside considered psik reisha when the Shulchan Aruch says psik reisha doesn't apply if the action could be done without that result? The shiur explores whether trapping depends on the inherent nature of the action or the specific circumstances, developing insights about melacha definition and intent.
This shiur tackles a fundamental question in psik reisha: the Shulchan Aruch establishes that if a melacha can be performed without an inevitable secondary result, then even when done with that result, it's not considered psik reisha. Rabbi Zweig applies this principle to the Gemara (גמרא)'s case of closing a door when a deer is inside. The Rashba permits this even with intent to trap the deer, provided one also intends to secure the house. The Ran objects that this should constitute psik reisha regardless of intent. The Shiltei Gibborim attempts to resolve this by arguing that since it's possible to close doors without trapping animals, this doesn't qualify as psik reisha. However, Rabbi Zweig finds this reasoning problematic - the Rashba explicitly permits the action even with intent to trap, making the psik reisha analysis seemingly irrelevant.
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Kesubos 6b
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