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Why do Tosafos (תוספות) and Rashi (רש"י) disagree about the validity of migul in cases of maalos l'yuchsin? The shiur develops that Rashi holds migul can work for matters of maalos l'yuchsin (requiring only vadai psak, not complete proof), while Tosafos maintains that maalos l'yuchsin requires rayah (witnesses) and migul cannot help at all.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Kesubos 13a, focusing on the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the application of migul in cases involving maalos l'yuchsin (lineage matters). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a woman was secluded (yichud) and claims either 'kashya nivalti' (I was violated by a Jew) or 'lo nivalti' (I was not violated). The core issue is whether she is believed through the mechanism of migul - since she could have made a better claim, we believe her current statement.
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Kesubos 13a
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