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When does caring for someone else's chametz violate the Pesach (פסח) prohibition? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle that accepting financial responsibility makes another's property 'like your own money' creates a sophisticated framework. This transforms bailment dynamics into ownership questions and explains why even potential coercion can establish forbidden possession.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of a complex sugya in Pesachim 5b-6a dealing with chametz ownership and the principle of 'ein li elah binachri.' The Gemara (גמרא) discusses the difference between 'nachri shekivashto' (a non-Jew that one has conquered) and 'nachri shelo kivashto' (a non-Jew that one has not conquered), examining when each case would render chametz ownership permissible or forbidden during Pesach (פסח). Rabbi Zweig explores Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary explaining that the pasuk 'lo yeira lecha' teaches that what is yours you cannot see, but what belongs to others (like a non-Jew or hekdesh) you may see. The Gra's novel interpretation is discussed, suggesting that even another Jew's chametz in one's possession would violate bal yeira'eh, though Rabbi Zweig questions this reading based on the Gemara's emphasis on non-Jewish cases. The discussion delves into the mechanics of bailment (pikadon) and when accepting responsibility (kabbalat acharayut) for someone else's chametz would make one liable for bal yeira'eh. A key principle emerges: when one is obligated to pay if the chametz is stolen or lost, it becomes 'like one's own money' and thus forbidden. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position is analyzed, which extends liability even to cases where one has no formal legal obligation but would be forced to pay through coercion. The shiur examines the distinction between present obligations versus potential future obligations in determining ownership status. The Taz's innovative approach is discussed, explaining why a shomer of Jewish-owned chametz who fails to sell it before Pesach becomes a poshei'a (negligent party) and thus liable, even when he could normally return the object intact. Rabbi Zweig connects this sugya to the following Gemara about arnuna (royal tax) and bechor obligations, exploring Rabbeinu Chananel's interpretation that perception of ownership (rather than just legal ownership) can determine religious obligations. This leads to a sophisticated discussion of whether 'lo yimatzei' creates a form of ownership based on public perception and responsibility, offering a unifying principle for understanding various forms of constructive ownership in Jewish law.
Pesachim 5b-6a
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