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When two people collaborate on a single Shabbos (שבת) violation, who owes a korban? The shiur develops the machloket between Tosafot and the Rash: whether each person must perform a complete melacha independently, or whether having a share in any collective violation creates liability.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion regarding shnayim she'asu - when two people collaborate in performing a single act that violates Shabbos (שבת). The central question examined is under what circumstances each participant becomes liable for a korban (sin offering). The Gemara distinguishes between different scenarios: ze yochol ve'ze yochol (where each person could perform the entire act alone), ze yochol ve'ze eino yochol (where one could do it alone but the other could not), and ze eino yochol ve'ze eino yochol (where neither could perform it alone). Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental machloket between Tosafot and the Rash regarding the theoretical basis for liability. According to one approach, each person is liable because they performed a complete act of Shabbos desecration. According to the alternative view, liability stems from having a share in the collective Shabbos violation that occurred. The shiur examines how Tosafot in different places (our sugya versus Bava Kamma) appear to take contradictory positions on this issue. The analysis includes discussion of when someone is considered to be 'working for' another person versus performing their own independent act, and how this affects their culpability. The Rash's position is explored, particularly his view that only the eino yochol (the one who cannot perform alone) should be liable in mixed cases, because the yochol is merely assisting rather than performing his own violation. Throughout, the shiur grapples with the conceptual question of whether Shabbos liability requires performing a complete melacha oneself, or whether partial participation in a collective violation suffices for obligation.
Shabbos 3a
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