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When does a husband's claim that he saw his wife committing adultery make her forbidden to him? The shiur analyzes whether such testimony requires kinyan v'stirah (formal warning and concealment) or qualifies as eidus (testimony), exploring Rashi (רש"י)'s view that it depends on the husband's expertise versus Tosafot's position about requiring eidei kiyum.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Kesubos 9a dealing with when a husband's testimony about his wife's adultery creates a prohibition. The Gemara (גמרא) begins with a fundamental question: Rabbi Elazar states that a woman only becomes forbidden to her husband through kinyan v'stirah (warning followed by seclusion), but this seems to contradict cases of pesach (פסח) patuach (open doorway testimony) where no formal warning was given. Rashi (רש"י) interprets the Gemara's approach as distinguishing between different types of knowledge. When there are proper eidim (witnesses), the woman becomes forbidden. However, when the husband himself claims to have witnessed the adultery (pesach patuach), this creates a more complex situation. According to Rashi's understanding, the husband in such cases is typically lo kimle (not an expert) - he believes he saw adultery but we cannot be certain of his expertise in identifying what constitutes a prohibited act. This uncertainty should require kinyan v'stirah to create raglayim l'davar (reasonable basis for suspicion).
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Kesubos 9a
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