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Why predate a get to save a woman from execution? The Gemara (גמרא) offers two approaches: avoiding the obligation of bi'ur ra mei'kirbecha versus preventing her from being mezanah knowing her husband will cover for her. A second discussion examines when a husband must provide mezuzah when marriage is delayed.
The shiur begins with an analysis of a fundamental question in Kesubos 2a regarding why one would predate a get to save a woman who is liable for execution. The Gemara (גמרא) presents the case where a woman has committed adultery and faces capital punishment, but her husband can save her life by predating their divorce document. Two approaches emerge to explain the concern about this practice. The first approach suggests the problem is that predating the get would violate the obligation of bi'ur ra mei'kirbecha - the requirement to eliminate evil from our midst. When someone is liable for capital punishment, there exists a positive obligation to ensure they face justice, similar to the case in Chullin regarding birds that must be brought to beis din rather than sent away through shiluach hakan. By predating the get, the husband would be actively preventing the fulfillment of this Torah (תורה) obligation.
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Kesubos 2a
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