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When does the principle of kan nimtza kan hoya apply? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach differs from Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding a woman's claim that she was violated after erusin. The analysis develops a fundamental distinction between gradual processes (like physical blemishes) and instantaneous actions (like violation).
This shiur examines a fundamental disagreement between the Rambam (רמב"ם) and other Rishonim regarding the application of kan nimtza kan hoya (where something is found, there it was) in cases of a woman claiming violation after erusin. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 11a discusses a case where a husband claims his wife was not a virgin, and she responds that she was violated after erusin. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) argue that the Mishna must be discussing a case where there was sufficient time after the chuppah for the woman to have been violated, because otherwise we would apply kan nimtza kan hoya - since the violation was discovered in the husband's domain, we would assume it occurred there originally, even before erusin. This reading requires adding significant details not explicitly stated in the Mishna.
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Kesubos 11a
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