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If someone inadvertently begins removing an object on Shabbos (שבת) but remembers mid-action, may they complete the removal? Tosafos (תוספות) argues that once the ma'aseh began, completion is forbidden even to prevent a Torah (תורה) violation. The analysis reveals when lesser transgressions to prevent greater ones apply only before the forbidden action starts.
This shiur provides a detailed examination of Gemara (גמרא) Shabbos (שבת) 4a, focusing on a complex halachic question: if someone begins to take out an object on Shabbos b'shogeg (inadvertently) but then remembers it's Shabbos midway through the action, may they complete the removal or must they stop? The Gemara presents the case where someone puts an object in their mouth and then remembers it's Shabbos - are they permitted to take it out to avoid transgressing, or must they leave it there? Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental kasha (difficulty) raised by Tosafos (תוספות): if the person remembers it's Shabbos, why would there be any reason to allow them to take it out? The remembering itself should eliminate the need for any dispensation. The shiur examines whether this creates a contradiction between doing a meizid action (intentional removal) to prevent a shogeg violation.
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Shabbos 4a
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