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When are we obligated to investigate (mevar) a doubt rather than rely on halachic presumptions? The Rashba and Trumas HaDeshen debate this in cases of safek safeka. The shiur explores whether a visible problem (re'ayah) creates an obligation to investigate, even when statistical probabilities would permit the item.
This shiur examines the fundamental question of when Jewish law requires active investigation (bedikah) rather than relying on halachic presumptions like rov (majority) or safek safeka (double doubt). The discussion centers on a dispute between the Rashba, who holds there is an obligation to investigate in cases of safek safeka, and the Trumas HaDeshen, who disagrees. The Noda B'Yehuda attempts to resolve this by distinguishing cases where there is a chezkas issur (presumption of prohibition) from those with chezkas heter (presumption of permission). Rabbi Zweig develops a novel approach through analyzing Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary. He suggests that the obligation to investigate applies differently depending on whether the prohibited action can be delayed. For example, with food that could spoil, eating today versus tomorrow represents the same essential use, so one should wait and investigate first. However, with clothing or living arrangements, each day's use is distinct and irreplaceable - today's wearing cannot be done tomorrow, today's living cannot be postponed.
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Kesubos 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
