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When convicted criminals with different death penalties get mixed up, why does the Mishna rule they all get the lighter punishment? Tosafos (תוספות) holds Beis Din can actually execute anyone with any of the four death penalties when necessary. The chiddush is that the Mishna teaches the optimal approach for giving proper atonement.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental dispute in Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the four methods of Beis Din execution (arba misos Beis Din) when dealing with mixed-up cases. The Gemara (גמרא) in Makkos 2a discusses what happens when people sentenced to different death penalties become confused - the Mishna rules they all receive the lighter punishment. Tosafos asks a fundamental question: if Beis Din has flexibility in execution methods, what's the proof that a lenient warning (hasra) can suffice for a stricter penalty? The shiur presents Tosafos's revolutionary position that Beis Din fundamentally operates under the principle of "bi'arta ra mi'kirbecha" (removing evil from your midst). This means the primary obligation is simply to execute the person in one of the four prescribed ways - not necessarily the specific method mentioned for each crime. The particular method of execution serves to give the condemned person proper atonement (kapara), but if circumstances require, any of the four methods can be used.
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Makkos 2a
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