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Why does a miggo work for one case but not another when witnesses saw different levels of impropriety? The shiur develops Tosfos's position that ma'alos habiyuchsin requires eidim only when there's a genuine safek, but when testimony creates certainty (like sfeik sfeika or valid miggo), the requirement is bypassed.
This shiur provides an intricate analysis of Gemara (גמרא) Kesubos 13a, focusing on the dispute between Rav Gamaliel and Rabbi Yehoshua regarding when a woman is believed about her status after witnesses observe suspicious behavior. The central tension explored is why a miggo (logical argument of 'she could have said something better') works in some cases but not others when ma'alos habiyuchsin (strictness regarding lineage) applies. Rabbi Zweig carefully examines Tosfos's approach versus Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation. According to Tosfos, if the Mishna mentioned only one case, we would understand everything from Rav Gamaliel's perspective, with the second case teaching us Rabbi Yehoshua's position. However, a fundamental question emerges: how do we know that 'meuberes' (pregnant) refers to having a child rather than just being a euphemism for relations?
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Kesubos 13a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
