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Does passive receiving constitute hanachah on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur analyzes the fundamental machloket between Rashi (רש"י), who holds that passive catching creates liability, and Tosafot, who require active grabbing. This dispute reshapes how we understand shared liability when two people perform parts of one melachah.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Masechta Shabbos (שבת) 5a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of 'omad bimkomo v'kivel' - one who stands in place and receives an object on Shabbos. Rabbi Zweig examines the fundamental machloket between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot regarding the nature of hanachah (placement) and whether passive receiving constitutes a ma'aseh hanachah. According to Rashi's interpretation, the case involves someone who throws an object and then runs to catch it, creating both an akirah (removal) and a separate hanachah. Rashi holds that passive catching can constitute a valid hanachah, which is why the Gemara asks 'ma ikomi bo lei' (how could there be a question) - indicating certainty of liability. Tosafot disagrees fundamentally, arguing that passive receiving is not a hanachah at all. Only active grabbing (chatifah) would constitute a ma'aseh hanachah. This leads Tosafot to reverse the order of the Gemara's cases and interpret the kasha differently. The shiur explores the implications of this machloket for understanding shnaim she'asu (two people performing one act), examining whether two people can share liability for a single hanachah. Rabbi Zweig analyzes how this connects to the broader principle of whether multiple people can be liable for parts of one melachah. The discussion includes examination of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position, which appears to allow for shared liability in cases where one person throws and another actively catches. Throughout the analysis, Rabbi Zweig demonstrates how this seemingly technical dispute reflects fundamental differences in understanding the nature of melachah on Shabbos and the requirements for liability.
Shabbos 5a
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