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How can we reconcile contradictory Gemaras about believing a woman's testimony versus a man's testimony regarding paternity? The shiur analyzes three approaches in Tosfos to resolve the apparent contradiction between our sugya and the Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos regarding when testimony is believed in cases of suspected adultery.
The shiur examines a complex Tosfos on Kesubos 14a that addresses an apparent contradiction between different Talmudic passages regarding the believability of testimony about a child's paternity. The central tension arises from comparing our Gemara (גמרא)'s ruling with a passage in Yevamos about when we believe claims regarding whether a child born to an arusah (betrothed woman) is legitimate. The Gemara discusses a case where an arusah becomes pregnant and there's a question about the child's status. According to our sugya, if the arus (betrothed man) admits to having relations with her (chad hakomoda), the child is considered legitimate according to all opinions, including Rabbi Yehoshua. However, this seems to contradict a Gemara in Yevamos that discusses cases where even with bo (testimony that they lived together) and the woman's own testimony, the child might still be considered illegitimate according to certain opinions.
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Kesubos 14a
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