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Why does the Mishna forbid certain wicks and oils for both Shabbos (שבת) and Chanukah (חנוכה) lighting using identical language when the underlying reasons differ? The shiur develops a chakira distinguishing between absolute issur (Shabbos) versus suboptimal mitzvah (מצוה) performance (Chanukah). This framework resolves why Rav Huna's concern about 'kofa zakugla' applies differently in each context.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of Masechta Shabbos (שבת) 21a-b regarding the halacha (הלכה) of 'ein madlikin' - the prohibition against using certain wicks and oils for lighting candles on both Shabbos and Chanukah (חנוכה). Rabbi Zweig begins by questioning the precise meaning of 'ein madlikin' - whether it means 'you are not allowed' (issur) or 'you should not' (not fulfilling the mitzvah (מצוה) properly). He explores why the Mishna states the prohibition for both Shabbos and Chanukah using identical language, when the underlying reasons seem different. The analysis focuses on Rav Huna's position that these materials are 'kofa zakugla' (likely to be extinguished) and 'mutav lishtamish l'ohr' (permissible to use for light). Rabbi Zweig examines Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary extensively, particularly questioning why Rashi uses the term 'l'sakna' (to fix/repair) rather than 'l'hadlika' (to light). He presents the Beis HaLevi's difficult interpretation that 'kofa zakugla' refers not to lights that go out completely, but to those that are diminishing while still burning, creating a situation where one might be negligent (poshea) in maintaining proper lighting.
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Shabbos 21a-b
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