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Why does halacha (הלכה) forbid entering dangerous places if everything happens by Divine decree? The shiur examines the debate between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on traveling at night, developing a fundamental distinction: Rashi holds one must avoid even deserved punishments that Hashem (ה׳) delays through mercy, while Tosfos holds the prohibition addresses self-inflicted harm through free will. This framework reveals how people rationalize self-destructive behavior as "hashgacha."
The shiur opens with a fundamental question about the halacha (הלכה) of makom sakana (dangerous places): if everything happens by hashgacha pratis, why would there be an issur to enter a dangerous situation? If something is decreed to happen, it will happen anyway; if not, nothing will occur. The Gemara (גמרא) in Pesachim discusses the obligation to travel only during daylight, derived from the pasuk "ki tov." Rashi (רש"י) explains this is because of wild animals and robbers at night, while Tosfos explains it's because of potholes (boros) one cannot see in the dark. Rabbi Zweig frames the core philosophical problem: we believe in hashgacha, so what does it mean that one cannot put oneself in a makom sakana? If something bad is supposed to happen, it will happen regardless of location. The resolution begins with understanding the Mesilas Yesharim's principle that according to midas hadin, a person would be punished immediately for any chet. HaKadosh Baruch Hu's chesed (חסד) is that He postpones the implementation of din to give opportunity for teshuvah. Many people walk around deserving certain punishments that haven't yet been implemented because of this divine mercy.
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Pesachim 2a
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