No community start suggestion yet.
Why doesn't the principle of kan nimtza kan haya (where found, there it was) apply when a husband discovers his wife wasn't a virgin after claiming she was raped post-betrothal? The shiur develops a novel approach that the mekach ta'us here isn't the physical defect but rather being deceived into a scandalous court case, which kan nimtza kan haya cannot address.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Kesubos 12b dealing with a case where a husband claims "pesach (פסח) pasuach matzasi" (I found an open entrance) after his wife claims she was raped after betrothal ("mishearastani nanasti"). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses when the principle of kan nimtza kan haya applies to determine whether defects occurred before or after betrothal, affecting who bears the burden of proof. Rabbi Zweig analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s position that our sugya should follow the principle of kan nimtza kan haya from the parallel case of physical defects (mumin). According to this principle, wherever a defect is discovered determines when it occurred - if found in the father's domain, it happened there; if in the husband's domain, it happened there. Tosafos argues this should apply to our case as well.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 12b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
