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Why doesn't the principle of kan nimtza kan haya (where found, there it was) apply when a husband discovers his wife wasn't a virgin after claiming she was raped post-betrothal? The shiur develops a novel approach that the mekach ta'us here isn't the physical defect but rather being deceived into a scandalous court case, which kan nimtza kan haya cannot address.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Kesubos 12b dealing with a case where a husband claims "pesach (פסח) pasuach matzasi" (I found an open entrance) after his wife claims she was raped after betrothal ("mishearastani nanasti"). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses when the principle of kan nimtza kan haya applies to determine whether defects occurred before or after betrothal, affecting who bears the burden of proof. Rabbi Zweig analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s position that our sugya should follow the principle of kan nimtza kan haya from the parallel case of physical defects (mumin). According to this principle, wherever a defect is discovered determines when it occurred - if found in the father's domain, it happened there; if in the husband's domain, it happened there. Tosafos argues this should apply to our case as well.
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Kesubos 12b
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