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Why does the Mishna count only certain hotsaah violations as melachos while excluding equally prohibited acts on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur develops Rashi (רש"י)'s distinction between complete melachos versus mere issurim, showing that partial acts like akira without hanachah achieve melacha status only when ikar hamigzar applies - preventing completion of the full forbidden work.
This Gemara (גמרא) shiur analyzes Masechta Shabbos (שבת) 3a, focusing on the fundamental question of why the Mishna counts only certain Shabbos violations as melachos while excluding others that are equally prohibited. The central issue revolves around understanding Rashi (רש"י)'s position on cases involving akira (picking up) and hanachah (placing down) in the context of hotsaah (carrying) on Shabbos. Rabbi Zweig presents several major difficulties (kashas) with Rashi's interpretation. The first kasha questions why cases that are assur l'dechi ufchatus (prohibited from the outset) are not counted among the four cases in the Mishna, even though they constitute violations of Shabbos law. If these actions are forbidden, why doesn't the Mishna include them in its enumeration?
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Shabbos 3a
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