The Prohibition of Divination: Eliezer's Test and the Centrality of Free Choice

Rabbi Zweig opens with a striking contradiction. Eliezer sets up a sign at the well—whichever young woman offers to draw water for him and his camels will be the one designated for Yitzchok—and the Gemara (גמרא) identifies this as a classic case of nichush (divination). The Rambam (רמב"ם) rules that divination is forbidden and punishable by lashes. Yet the Raavad sharply objects: how can the Rambam accuse Eliezer, the faithful servant of Avrohom and teacher of Torah (תורה), of transgressing? Tosafos (תוספות) asks similarly: nichush is forbidden under the Noahide laws, so how could Eliezer have violated them? Tosafos answers that Eliezer didn't actually give the bracelets until after he ascertained Rivka's lineage, so it wasn't true nichush. But the Maharal challenges this: even if he waited to give the gifts, had Rivka not offered water for the camels, he never would have chosen her—so it was still nichush. The Kesef Mishneh, Maharal, and Ran therefore offer a different resolution: nichush only applies to irrational signs (like a black cat crossing one's path or bread falling). Eliezer's test was entirely logical—he needed a woman of chesed (חסד) for Yitzchok, and devised a practical character test. That's not divination; it's intelligence.