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When may one violate a rabbinic prohibition to prevent another's transgression? Tosfos on Shabbos (שבת) 4a distinguishes between cases where the person has already acted versus where no transgression occurred yet. The analysis suggests that lifnei iver is violated only when the person actually transgresses, not merely when the opportunity is provided.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Tosfos on Shabbos (שבת) 4a regarding the principle of saving someone from transgression. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses when one may violate a rabbinic prohibition to prevent another person from committing an issur. Tosfos draws a crucial distinction between two scenarios: in the case of ma'adin (putting something in), where the person has already performed the forbidden action, versus the case involving a chaver and an am ha'aretz with tevel, where no transgression has yet occurred. Rabbi Zweig explores Tosfos's reasoning that in the tevel case, since no issur has been committed yet, one may violate a rabbinic prohibition to save the person. However, in the ma'adin case, since the forbidden act has already been performed, there is no basis to violate even a rabbinic prohibition for such a person. This analysis leads to a fundamental question about the nature of lifnei iver - whether one violates this prohibition at the moment of giving the forbidden object or only when the recipient actually consumes it.
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Shabbos 4a
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