A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
How does zechiyah (acting for another's benefit) work for a katan who cannot appoint a shliach? Tosafos (תוספות) develops two approaches: either zechiyah derives from shlichus (requiring full da'as), or shlichus derives from zechiyah (working through umdana when it's a clear benefit).
The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s fundamental question about the relationship between zechiyah (acting for someone's benefit) and shlichus (agency) in Jewish law. Tosafos begins by establishing that zechiyah operates through the principle of shlichus - we assume (anan sa'hadi) that the beneficiary would want to appoint the actor as his agent. This creates a logical problem: if a katan (minor) cannot legally appoint a shliach according to the Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin, how can anyone act for his benefit through zechiyah? Tosafos presents two distinct approaches to resolve this difficulty. In his first answer, he maintains that zechiyah is fundamentally based on shlichus, but argues that a katan is only excluded from the general laws of shlichus when the matter involves potential detriment. When something is purely beneficial (zechus gamur), even a katan can be included in the framework of agency. The logic is that for matters like separating terumah, where there might be different preferences about how much to give, we cannot assume what someone truly wants. But for clear benefits, no such uncertainty exists.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 11a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
