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How does ones k'man d'ovid dami work in conditional gittin and kiddushin? The Rosh brings clear evidence from the Mishna that it doesn't create fictional fulfillment when the condition was never met. Rather, it extends deadlines when the action was done late due to force.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental disagreement between the Rosh and Ran regarding the principle of ones k'man d'ovid dami (a person under duress is considered as if he acted) in conditional gittin and kiddushin. The Rosh provides a clear logical framework: if someone says "im lo basi yehi get" (if I don't come, it should be a get), ones can prevent this from being considered fulfillment of the condition. However, if he says "im basi" (if I come), ones cannot create fictional coming - he simply didn't come. The Ran cites a Yerushalmi disagreement between Rav Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding someone who says "harei at mekudeshes li" on condition that he makes nisuin within six months, but becomes sick. The Ran surprisingly argues that by kiddushin, even Rav Yochanan agrees ones k'man d'ovid dami, while by gittin he doesn't. The Ran's reasoning distinguishes unilateral actions (get) from bilateral agreements (kiddushin).
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Kesubos 2b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
