No community start suggestion yet.
Why wasn't Bathsheba forbidden to Dovid after her relations with him? Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) offer different approaches to when a woman becomes forbidden to others. The Rashash proposes that the prohibition depends on whether the husband actually knows of the adultery, not just the objective violation.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding why Bathsheba was not forbidden to King Dovid after their relationship. The Gemara (גמרא) asks why she wasn't forbidden to Dovid, given that she was married to Uriah and had been with another man. Rashi explains that she should be forbidden to Dovid because "many people knew" (harbeh adam yodu), suggesting that public knowledge creates the prohibition. Tosafos, however, argues that Dovid himself knew about the relationship, which should be sufficient grounds to forbid her to him, based on the principle that one who knows of adultery cannot be with that woman.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 9a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
