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If someone eats maror during karpas, must they eat it again later to fulfill the maror obligation? Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) disagree on when mitzvos tzrichos kavana applies: Rashi holds that specific intent becomes necessary only when the same action could fulfill multiple obligations simultaneously, while Tosafos focuses on the timing and primacy of the main mitzvah (מצוה).
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of Pesachim 114b, focusing on the principle of mitzvos tzrichos kavana (commandments require intent) in the context of the Pesach (פסח) seder. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where someone eats maror (bitter herbs) during karpas (the vegetable eaten early in the seder) - must they eat maror again later to fulfill their obligation? Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) offer dramatically different interpretations of the Gemara's reasoning. According to Rashi's reading, the Gemara states that since the person made a borei pri ha'adama blessing (and not an al achilas maror blessing), we can be certain they weren't thinking about maror. Tosafos objects that this reading makes the Gemara's language of 'dilma' (perhaps) inappropriate - if we know for certain based on the blessing, why does the Gemara use tentative language?
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Pesachim 114b
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