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What is the halachic significance of badeken, and when does it occur in the wedding process? The Mordechai holds that badeken itself constitutes a form of chuppah, creating a machlokes with other Rishonim about the timing of mourning laws during sheva berachos. This analysis suggests badeken represents the bride's transfer from her father's reshus before kiddushin—explaining both the emotional weight of the moment and resolving difficult Rishonim about chuppah before kiddushin.
This shiur examines a fascinating halachic dispute regarding the timing of mourning during wedding celebrations, focusing on the significance of badeken (veiling ceremony) in Jewish wedding law. The foundational halacha (הלכה) establishes that if the father of the groom dies before the chuppah, the wedding proceeds first, followed by mourning. However, if other relatives die, mourning typically precedes the wedding celebrations. The Taz brings down a crucial shaila: what happens if a relative dies after the badeken but before the actual chuppah? According to the Mordechai, badeken itself constitutes a form of chuppah, meaning that once it occurs, the wedding has begun, and therefore sheva berachos would continue even if relatives die afterward. The Drisha agrees with this position. However, the Taz disputes this, arguing that badeken cannot be considered chuppah because the groom can still leave after badeken if financial arrangements aren't met—something that frequently occurred.
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Kesubos 4b-5b
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