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Can the Sages change their decree about wedding days when a gentile ruler threatens to assault Jewish brides? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether preserving rabbinic authority requires martyrdom, but concludes the rabbis themselves can modify their takana. The discussion reveals fundamental tensions between different types of obligations and levels of tznius.
The shiur analyzes a complex passage in Kesubos 3b dealing with a fundamental question about the nature of rabbinic authority and the obligation of martyrdom. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a case where gentile authorities decree that any Jewish bride married on Wednesday must first submit to the ruler - creating a direct conflict with the rabbinic decree that weddings should occur on Wednesdays. The question becomes: should Jews be willing to die rather than violate the rabbinic decree? Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the seeming contradiction between general principles of martyrdom during times of religious persecution (shas hashmad) and the Gemara's casual assumption that the rabbinic decree can simply be changed. Normally, when gentiles attempt to uproot Jewish practices - even minor customs - the law requires martyrdom rather than compliance. Yet here the Gemara suggests the solution is for the Sages themselves to change their wedding day decree.
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Kesubos 3b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
