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How can a minor gentile have legal agency when both being a minor and being a gentile normally disqualify someone? Tosafos (תוספות) offers two approaches: either he will eventually become an adult Jew, or we treat him as Jewish through the conversion process itself.
This shiur analyzes a complex Tosafos (תוספות) on Kesubos 11a dealing with the concept of agency (shlichut) for a minor gentile who is being converted. The fundamental question is how such a person can have legal standing when two factors normally disqualify someone from agency: being a minor (katan) and being a gentile (goy). The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that normally a minor has no agency midoraita, only midrabbanan, because eventually he will reach adulthood (asi l'klal). However, a gentile has no agency at all because he will never become part of the Jewish legal framework. Tosafos presents two resolutions to this apparent contradiction. The first approach suggests that because this gentile child will eventually become Jewish through conversion, he is considered 'asi l'klal' - destined to join the Jewish community with full legal standing. The second approach, described as 'git avyado bon k'echad,' treats him as already having Jewish status for the purposes of this legal transaction because the very act of acquiring property for him is part of the conversion process. Rabbi Zweig explores the profound implications of both approaches, particularly the second one which seems to suggest that the Sages can effectively declare someone Jewish for certain purposes even before formal conversion is complete. This raises fundamental questions about the nature of rabbinical authority and whether they can override Torah (תורה) law through the principle of 'yesh koach l'chachamim la'akor davar min haTorah.' The shiur also addresses practical halachic issues that arise from these approaches, such as whether such a person could observe Shabbos (שבת) (given the prohibition of 'nochri she'shavas chayav misah'), marry a Jewish woman, or perform other mitzvos while technically still a gentile. The discussion reveals the complex interplay between different areas of Jewish law and the extraordinary powers the Sages claimed in certain circumstances.
Kesubos 11a
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