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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) permit freeing a slave for any mitzvah (מצוה) when the Gemara (גמרא) seems to limit this to communal mitzvos? The shiur analyzes a fundamental machloket about whether lo yaamtem tavodu creates one prohibition or two, and shows how this chakira resolves the apparent contradiction between the Rambam and other Rishonim.
This advanced shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of the halachic complexities surrounding being meshacher (freeing) one's eved, focusing on the principle of lo yaamtem tavodu (you shall work with them forever). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining a fundamental question regarding the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position in Hilchos Avodim Perek 9 Halacha (הלכה) 6, where the Rambam rules that one may free an eved for a mitzvah (מצוה) d'rabbanan, yet the Gemara (גמרא) seems to indicate the heter (permission) is specifically for mitzvah d'rabbim (a communal mitzvah). The shiur explores why the Rambam omits the case of the Mishna regarding chatzi eved v'chatzi ben chorin (half-slave, half-free person), despite ruling on it elsewhere. A central focus is the machloket (dispute) between the Rambam and Ramban (רמב"ן) regarding whether lo yaamtem tavodu constitutes one mitzvah or two separate obligations - working with the eved and not freeing him. The Ran's position is analyzed, holding that the prohibition stems from lo seichanem (not showing them favor), meaning one cannot do a favor for a non-Jew, making freeing the eved problematic unless done for one's own benefit. The Rashba's view is explored, suggesting that by a chatzi eved v'chatzi ben chorin, there is no violation of lo yaamtem tavodu since the person is partially free. Tosafot's complex position is examined, requiring dechiya (overriding) in both the case of Rav Elazar being meshacher his eved and the Mishna's case, suggesting two separate prohibitions exist. The shiur delves into the technical aspects of when mitzvah is docheh (overrides) lo yaamtem tavodu, whether it must be b'idna (simultaneously), and the distinction between mitzvah and mitzvah d'rabbim. Throughout, various Gemara sources are analyzed, particularly from Gittin and Brachos, examining apparent contradictions and reconciling different approaches of the Rishonim.
Shabbos 4a
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