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Why does safek sfeika overcome chazakah in some cases but not others? The shiur analyzes Tosfos's position that when a chazakah resolves only one of two doubts, safek sfeika prevails, but when both doubts can be individually resolved, no safek sfeika exists.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex Tosafot on Kesubos 9a dealing with the relationship between safek sfeika (double doubt) and chazakah (legal presumption). The discussion begins with the Penei Yehoshua's question on Tosafot: if cheskat haguf (presumption regarding the body) is stronger than cheskat heter (presumption of permission), why does the Gemara (גמרא) allow safek sfeika to override cheskat haguf in the case of an eishes Yisrael (Jewish woman)? Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental principle to resolve this difficulty. When a chazakah addresses both doubts in a safek sfeika, the chazakah prevails. However, when the chazakah only resolves one of the two doubts, the safek sfeika is stronger. In the case of eishes Yisrael, there are two doubts: whether relations occurred (tachat vs. lo tachat) and whether it was consensual (onas vs. ratzon). The cheskat haguf only addresses the first doubt but says nothing about the second, allowing the safek sfeika to function.
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Kesubos 9a
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