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How can a woman marry a kohen when we're uncertain if the man who violated her was a chalal? Rashi (רש"י) learns the heter is purely chazakah-based, requiring no testimony at all. Tosfos argues the case requires bari (certain testimony) but allows two rovs (majorities) to create sufficient certainty for marriage.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on Kesubos 14b regarding the halachic requirements for a violated woman to marry a kohen. The central question revolves around whether certain testimony (ta'anas bari) is required, or whether chazakah (presumptive status) combined with statistical majorities (rov) suffices. Rashi's position is that according to Rav Gamaliel, the woman's chazakah of kashrus alone permits the marriage, even with rov pesulim (majority of disqualified men). Rabbi Zweig explains that Rashi learns "hemed ishah al chazakasa" - she remains on her presumptive status of kashrus. This creates several difficulties: How does this reconcile with the previous sugya on Amud Alef where Rav Gamaliel requires bari? How does this avoid the principle of "ruba chazakah ruba adif" (majority overrides presumption)?
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Kesubos 14b
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