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Why do different Gemaras seem to have conflicting standards for psik reisha d'lo nicha lei? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between single-action cases (where lo ichpat lei suffices) versus direct melacha performance (where active rejection is required). This framework resolves apparent contradictions between Rashi (רש"י)'s positions across multiple sugyos.
This advanced shiur tackles a fundamental contradiction in the laws of psik reisha (inevitable unintended consequence) that appears across multiple Talmudic tractates. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 5b discusses whether one is liable for taking blood from a sea creature on Shabbos (שבת), where killing the creature is an inevitable consequence. Rabbi Zweig identifies a troubling inconsistency in Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to psik reisha d'lo nicha lei (where one doesn't want the consequence) across different contexts. The shiur begins by examining the Gemara's question about liability for netilat neshama (taking a life) when extracting dye from a sea creature. Rashi explains that one isn't liable because he prefers the creature stay alive for better dye quality - demonstrating that active preference against the consequence exempts from liability. However, this creates tension with the Gemara's subsequent discussion of rov bekim (majority of experts), which seems to apply a different standard.
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Kesubos 5b
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