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Why do different Gemaras seem to have conflicting standards for psik reisha d'lo nicha lei? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between single-action cases (where lo ichpat lei suffices) versus direct melacha performance (where active rejection is required). This framework resolves apparent contradictions between Rashi (רש"י)'s positions across multiple sugyos.
This advanced shiur tackles a fundamental contradiction in the laws of psik reisha (inevitable unintended consequence) that appears across multiple Talmudic tractates. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 5b discusses whether one is liable for taking blood from a sea creature on Shabbos (שבת), where killing the creature is an inevitable consequence. Rabbi Zweig identifies a troubling inconsistency in Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to psik reisha d'lo nicha lei (where one doesn't want the consequence) across different contexts. The shiur begins by examining the Gemara's question about liability for netilat neshama (taking a life) when extracting dye from a sea creature. Rashi explains that one isn't liable because he prefers the creature stay alive for better dye quality - demonstrating that active preference against the consequence exempts from liability. However, this creates tension with the Gemara's subsequent discussion of rov bekim (majority of experts), which seems to apply a different standard.
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Kesubos 5b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
