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What did Dovid mean when he reduced the 613 mitzvos to twelve principles? The Gemara (גמרא) reveals that mitzvos have two dimensions: fulfilling the obligation and achieving personal completion (hashlomah). Dovid identified twelve core principles that encapsulate the essential character development aspect of all mitzvos.
This shiur explores the famous Aggadic passage in Makkos 24b that discusses how Dovid HaMelech reduced the 613 mitzvos to twelve principles. Rabbi Zweig begins by clarifying that Dovid wasn't eliminating 602 mitzvos, but rather identifying a deeper structure within the mitzvah (מצוה) system. The analysis develops through an examination of a sugya in Shabbos (שבת) regarding reading by candlelight on Shabbos, where Rabbi Yishmael claimed exemption from the Rabbinic prohibition. This leads to a fundamental distinction between two aspects of mitzvos: the basic obligation (yotzei) and the character completion (hashlomah) that mitzvos are designed to achieve.
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Makkos 24b
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